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SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: 
THE LAW OF “DOMESTIC” AND 
“INTERNATIONAL” TERRORISM 
Shirin Sinnar* 
U.S. law differentiates between two categories of terrorism. “International 
terrorism” covers threats with a putative international nexus, even when they 
stem from U.S. citizens or residents acting only within the United States. 
“Domestic terrorism” applies to political violence thought to be purely domes-
tic in its origin and intended impact. The law permits broader surveillance, 
wider criminal charges, and more punitive treatment for crimes labeled in-
ternational terrorism. Law enforcement agencies frequently consider U.S. 
Muslims “international” threats even when they have scant foreign ties. As a 
result, they police and punish them more intensely than white nationalists 
and other “domestic” threats. This legal divide not only harms individuals 
and communities but also reinforces distorted public perceptions of terrorism 
that fuel anti-immigrant and discriminatory policies. 
This Article is the first to challenge the domestic–international divide in U.S. 
terrorism law. It maps the divergence in the investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of terrorism. It then refutes the three leading rationales for the 
divide: (1) civil liberties; (2) federalism; and (3) the magnitude of the threats. 
It further argues that, once the law divides threats into the “domestic” and 
“international,” the latter category will predictably expand to cover U.S. in-
dividuals perceived as “foreign,” even if they are citizens with negligible rela-
tionships abroad. Policymakers should reject the legal divide as both 
incoherent and invidious. But rather than “ratchet up” the criminalization of 
domestic terrorism in the name of equality, they should make the law’s ap-
proach to “international” terrorism more accountable and just. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the four years since a twenty-one-year-old white supremacist shot 
dead nine African American men and women at a Charleston church, a pub-
lic debate has emerged on the law’s response to political violence.1 Initially, 
 
 1. For a sample of the debate that followed the Charleston church shooting, see Jelani 
Cobb, Terrorism in Charleston, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/
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the public conversation centered largely on labeling acts of violence. Critics 
often charged that the race, religion, or ideology of suspects affected whether 
government officials and the media conceptualized such acts as “terrorism.”2 
But the conversation has increasingly moved from labeling to law, as com-
mentators and policymakers observe that, even where authorities recognize 
violence as terrorism, the policing and prosecution of terrorism differs 
across ideologies and communities.3 
The differences are even more stark than is generally recognized. The 
government intensively surveils and polices U.S. Muslim communities to 
root out potential terrorist threats. Law enforcement officials intercept 
phone conversations and obtain internet records with secret warrants from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).4 Through a vast 
network of confidential informants, the FBI identifies individuals deemed 
prone to “radicalization” and offers them ostensible opportunities to engage 
in violence.5 If individuals take the bait—sometimes after intense prodding 
from informants—federal prosecutors indict them for federal offenses in-
cluding material support to terrorism.6 Human rights advocates charge that 
these prosecutions target vulnerable individuals and induce them to commit 
 
magazine/2015/06/29/terrorism-in-charleston [https://perma.cc/4KGS-G2BM]; Julia Craven, 
Dylann Roof Wasn’t Charged with Terrorism Because He’s White, HUFFPOST (July 23, 2015, 
8:10 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dylann-roof-terrorism_us_55b107c9e4b07
af29d57a5fc [https://perma.cc/8T5C-M2K5]; Rick Gladstone, Many Ask, Why Not Call Church 
Shooting Terrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/us/
charleston-shooting-terrorism-or-hate-crime.html [https://perma.cc/EC6F-7UJ3]; and Ryan J. 
Reilly, FBI Director James Comey Still Unsure if White Supremacist’s Attack in Charleston Was 
Terrorism, HUFFPOST (July 9, 2015, 5:45 PM) (updated July 10, 2015), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/09/james-comey-charleston-terrorism-_n_7764614.html 
[https://perma.cc/U4L8-Q38V]. 
 2. For a more recent example, see Samantha Schmidt, Austin Bomber: ‘Challenged 
Young Man’ or ‘Terrorist’?, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/22/austin-bomber-challenged-young-man-or-terrorist/ 
[https://perma.cc/T7L6-FLTM]. 
 3. See, e.g., INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING, EQUAL TREATMENT? 
MEASURING THE LEGAL AND MEDIA RESPONSES TO IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.imv-report.org/ [https://perma.cc/PWM3-A46M] 
(arguing that Muslim perpetrators of ideological violence received harsher charges, longer sen-
tences, and more media coverage than non-Muslim perpetrators); Daniel Byman, Should We 
Treat Domestic Terrorists the Way We Treat ISIS?: What Works—and What Doesn’t, FOREIGN 
AFF. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-10-03/should-
we-treat-domestic-terrorists-way-we-treat-isis [https://perma.cc/9UZN-GXP8] (describing 
differences in treatment of ISIS sympathizers and domestic terrorists). 
 4. See infra Sections I.A.1–2. 
 5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILLUSION OF JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN US 
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 21–26 (2014); WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS (2015); Amna Akbar, Polic-
ing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 845–68 (2013); see also TREVOR AARONSON, 
THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 44 (2013). 
 6. See infra Section I.A.4. 
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crimes they would never have undertaken on their own.7 Sentences are 
steep—as high as life without parole for a twenty-three-year-old high school 
dropout who accepted an inert bomb from FBI operatives who stoked the 
young man’s ISIS sympathies.8 
The federal government takes a different approach to non-Muslim ter-
rorist threats. White supremacists, anti-government militias, sovereign citi-
zens, and other groups present a significant terrorist threat.9 The FBI 
investigates these individuals and groups using conventional warrants rather 
than secret foreign intelligence surveillance orders or other national security 
tools.10 While prosecutors pervasively use material support charges to 
“preemptively” target Islamic extremists, they rarely charge white national-
ists or anti-government extremists with material support.11 Studies suggest 
that the FBI does not use informants and undercover operations against 
right-wing threats as extensively or aggressively as it does with Muslims.12 
And local law enforcement officials prosecute many cases under state law, 
thereby precluding the application of a federal terrorism sentencing en-
hancement and other potential consequences of federal prosecution.13 
 
 7. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 27–54 (describing targeting of 
vulnerable individuals and informants’ active roles in generating plots). 
 8. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Suarez, No. 15-10009 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
19, 2017), ECF. No. 171; Office of Pub. Affairs, Florida Resident Sentenced to Life in Prison for 
Attempting to Possess a Weapon of Mass Destruction and Provide Material Support to a Terror-
ist Organization, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-
resident-sentenced-life-prison-attempting-possess-weapon-mass-destruction-and-provi-1 
[https://perma.cc/A2LS-UFAN]; Lisa Rose, The Massive FBI Sting to Bring Down an ISIS-
Supporting Weightlifter in Key West, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018, 3:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/01/24/politics/harlem-suarez-isis/index.html [https://perma.cc/XH7T-GA9X]. 
 9. JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN 
OVERVIEW 23–25 (2017). Among groups classified as “domestic” extremist movements, white 
supremacists are reportedly the most lethal. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN: WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM POSES 
PERSISTENT THREAT OF LETHAL VIOLENCE 4 (2017), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/
blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/9/13250/files/2017/11/White-Supremacist-Extremism-Joint-
Intelligence-Bulletin-1y5quxs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NKQ-DK9W]. Terrorism also emanates 
from left-wing organizations and causes, although studies show far fewer fatalities. See infra 
note 309 (reporting results from comparative studies). 
 10. See infra Sections I.A.1–2. 
 11. See infra Section I.A.4 (describing unavailability of some material support charges 
and nonuse of others against domestic terrorists). 
 12. See Jesse J. Norris & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk, Estimating the Prevalence of Entrap-
ment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 655 (2015) (finding, 
based on an original dataset, that “jihadi” and “left-wing” terrorism cases featured more indica-
tors of government “entrapment” or “borderline entrapment” than right-wing cases); David 
Neiwert, Home Is Where the Hate Is, INVESTIGATIVE FUND (June 22, 2017), https://
www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigation/2017/06/22/home-hate/ [https://perma.cc/JHD6-
XQF8] (stating that a much higher proportion of preempted plots among Islamist incidents, 
compared to far-right incidents, suggests allocation of fewer resources—such as informants 
and undercover operations—to far-right violence). 
 13. See infra Section I.A.5. 
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This divergence in the treatment of terrorist threats stems in part from a 
formal division in the law of terrorism. U.S. law differentiates between two 
categories of terrorism in the investigation and prosecution of individuals. 
The “international” category covers terrorism with a putative international 
nexus—even when the threat stems from U.S. citizens or residents on Amer-
ican soil contemplating acts only within the United States. The “domestic” 
category covers terrorism thought to be purely domestic in its origin and in-
tended impact. These categories thus do not coincide with the common un-
derstanding of “domestic” terrorism as occurring within the United States 
and “international” terrorism as committed abroad. Moreover, in practice, 
this categorization has a blunt impact because government officials largely 
consider threats of terrorism by Muslims to be international and threats by 
others to be domestic, even where there is little difference in their actual ge-
ography. For instance, the FBI characterizes U.S. citizens inspired by ISIS or 
al Qaeda propaganda as international terrorists even if they have no actual 
international ties, while it often views white supremacists and neo-Nazis as 
domestic terrorists despite the movements’ global dimensions.14 
The consequences of the legal divide between domestic and internation-
al terrorism—and its frequent application along ideological lines—are trou-
bling. The legal divide subjects U.S. Muslim communities to greater 
surveillance, with less oversight, than other groups. It exposes some offend-
ers to criminal punishment—and harsh sentences—for conduct that would 
not be criminal with respect to others. The discrepancy in consequences is 
greatest for individuals suspected of tenuous and uncertain connections to 
violence. 
Beyond these direct effects, the legal divide contributes to a flawed—and 
racialized—public understanding of the terrorist threat, with further reper-
cussions for public policy and communities. Federal officials say they hesi-
tate to describe white nationalist or anti-government cases as terrorism 
because federal terrorism charges are less available in domestic cases.15 In 
addition, the Justice Department only publishes statistics on international 
terrorism convictions, which reinforces perceptions that terrorists are pri-
marily Muslim and foreign.16 These skewed representations—facilitated by 
the binary legal regime—fuel exclusionary and discriminatory policies, like 
President Trump’s travel bans, that target Muslims and immigrants while 
minimizing attention to racial violence afflicting communities of color.17 
 
 14. See infra Sections I.A.1–4. 
 15. Ryan J. Reilly, There’s a Good Reason Feds Don’t Call White Guys Terrorists, Says 
DOJ Domestic Terror Chief, HUFFPOST (Jan. 11, 2018, 9:32 AM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-terrorists-domestic-extremists_us_5a550158e4b003133
ecceb74 [https://perma.cc/S8VP-9H9K] (quoting Justice Department domestic terrorism 
counsel stating that federal prosecutors do not describe cases as domestic terrorism where they 
do not deploy terrorism charges). 
 16. See infra Section I.B. 
 17. See infra Section I.B. 
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Despite the significance of the domestic–international terrorism divide 
and its increasing relevance in policy debates, legal scholarship has scarcely 
touched the subject. A handful of law review articles point out racial discrep-
ancies in the use of the terrorism label,18 advocate treating racist violence as 
terrorism,19 or address the legal distinction in particular contexts.20 Some le-
gal blog posts defend the distinction.21 But none of these pieces systematical-
ly addresses the scope, impact, or legitimacy of the terrorism divide. 
This Article illuminates and challenges the legal divide in the treatment 
of domestic and international terrorism within the United States. It shows 
that the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of terrorism diverges ac-
cording to the “domestic” or “international” classification of the threat. At 
the investigative stage, government officials use Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA) orders, National Security Letters, and other tools for inter-
national terrorism that involve lower substantive standards and less 
oversight.22 At the prosecution stage, federal officials routinely charge inter-
national terrorism defendants with material support charges that are una-
 
 18. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Online Essay, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and 
Double Standards, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1213 (2018) (arguing that the “lone wolf” label presump-
tively disconnects white and non-Muslim perpetrators from terrorism but connects Muslims 
to terrorism); Caroline Mala Corbin, Essay, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At 
the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (2017) (de-
scribing how false narratives about the race and religion of terrorists interact with propagan-
da); Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race, 
Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33 (2013) (arguing that 
crimes by non-Arabs and non-Muslims are typically not viewed as terrorism for complex rea-
sons). 
 19. See Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It 
Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 299 (2017) (arguing that government officials should have 
sought a terrorism sentencing enhancement for Charleston shooter Dylann Roof and calling 
for new terrorism statutes to cover such incidents); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Lessons on Terrorism 
and “Mistaken Identity” from Oak Creek, with a Coda on the Boston Marathon Bombings, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76, 77–83 (2013) (noting debate over whether 2012 shooting at Sikh 
temple should be labeled terrorism and arguing for a broader definition of the term in U.S. 
criminal law). 
 20. The best of these is a student comment: Nick Harper, Comment, FISA’s Fuzzy Line 
Between Domestic and International Terrorism, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1123 (2014). See also Marga-
ret K. Lewis, When Foreign Is Criminal, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 625, 669–70 (2015) (discussing mate-
rial support ban). 
 21. See, e.g., Jane Chong, White Hate but Islamic Terror? Charleston, Hate Crimes and 
Terrorism Per Quod, LAWFARE (June 21, 2015, 10:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/white-
hate-islamic-terror-charleston-hate-crimes-and-terrorism-quod [https://perma.cc/X7B7-
WNJA] (arguing that the Obama Administration has differentiated terrorism from other kinds 
of crime carefully and for justifiable legal reasons); Susan Hennessey, The Good Reasons to Not 
Charge All Terrorists with Terrorism, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2015, 11:34 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/good-reasons-not-charge-all-terrorists-terrorism [https://perma.cc/
SV28-L2NM] (arguing that federalism and civil liberties explain the differentiation across cate-
gories of ideologically motivated violence); see also Byman, supra note 3 (identifying potential 
benefits and complications from treating domestic terrorists similarly to Americans tied to for-
eign terrorism). 
 22. See infra Sections I.A.1–2. 
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vailable in domestic cases.23 In addition, due in part to the uneven federaliza-
tion of terrorism, federal prosecutors handle most international terrorism 
cases while local prosecutors frequently charge domestic terrorism under 
state law.24 This disproportionate federal treatment of international terror-
ism unequally exposes defendants to a severe federal terrorism sentencing 
enhancement that treats even first-time offenders charged with nonviolent 
offenses like defendants with the most serious criminal histories.25 
These legal differences do not account for all observed disparities be-
tween the treatment of Muslim suspects and those of other identities and 
ideologies. Even where certain laws apply to both domestic and international 
terrorism, law enforcement officials sometimes apply them differentially to 
Muslim individuals.26 Thus, formal legal divisions by no means furnish the 
whole explanation for differential treatment. That larger explanation in-
volves some combination of factors related to the influence of race and iden-
tity, contingent historical developments, security perceptions, and domestic 
politics. Still, the divide between domestic and international terrorism in 
significant areas of the law likely contributes to differential conceptualization 
of the threat and differential enforcement across the board. Because the legal 
distinction appears facially plausible, it allows government officials and soci-
ety to excuse observed disparities as the incidental consequences of a neutral 
and rational scheme. 
In undercutting the legitimacy of the domestic–international terrorism 
divide, this Article forces a confrontation with inequality. Although the his-
torical origins of the legal divide are complex, none of the three primary ra-
tionales articulated in its defense—civil liberties, federalism, and the 
magnitude of threats—provides a good reason to maintain it. 
First, some argue that civil liberties interests justify the greater protec-
tion of domestic terrorism because it presents heightened speech or privacy 
concerns. But I use the material support and foreign intelligence surveillance 
contexts to show that domestic and international terrorism equally implicate 
the civil liberties of U.S. communities.27 In each case, overbroad measures 
threaten speech and privacy and invite the suppression of dissent for im-
proper political reasons. Moreover, claims of heightened government inter-
ests with respect to international terrorism rest on simplistic distinctions 
between the government’s capacity to act within and beyond its borders. 
Given that the United States exercises substantial power over counterterror-
ism abroad, the government-interest side of the constitutional balance is not 
necessarily weightier with respect to international terrorism.28 
 
 23. See infra Section I.A.4. 
 24. See infra Section I.A.3. 
 25. See infra Section I.A.5. 
 26. See infra Section I.A.4 (discussing evidence of differential application of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A (2012), a statute that could be applied to both domestic and international terrorism). 
 27. See infra Sections II.A.1–2. 
 28. See infra Sections II.A.1–2. 
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Second, some contend that a respect for federalism explains why federal 
law unequally criminalizes domestic and international terrorism.29 Constitu-
tional doctrine, however, does not require the more limited federal approach 
to domestic terrorism.30 Whether the federal government should criminalize 
and prosecute more domestic terrorism is more complicated. Federal treat-
ment of domestic terrorism could provide greater resources, enable a cen-
tralized approach, and compensate for any inadequate state responses. Yet 
expanded federalization could also undermine local oversight of policing 
and expose more defendants to punitive consequences.31 While there are 
tradeoffs, the key point is that the benefits and burdens of a federal approach 
to domestic terrorism do not markedly differ from those applicable to terror-
ism with an international nexus. Thus, rather than justify dichotomous 
treatment, federalism concerns should trigger renewed attention to fairness 
and accountability with respect to international terrorism. 
Third, some justify the differential approach on the grounds that inter-
national terrorism presents a far greater threat.32 Limited public information 
and other challenges of terrorism risk assessment make this claim difficult 
either to prove or refute. But some evidence related to the scale of recent in-
cidents, the potential for mass casualties, and the organized nature of the 
threats calls into question assumptions of incommensurate threats.33 Fur-
thermore, even if the international terrorist threat is greater in the aggregate, 
that does not justify a different approach to individuals in the United States 
associated with each threat. For one thing, nothing in the international ter-
rorism category limits the distinctive legal treatment to significant threats.34 
FISA and material support provisions, for instance, reach groups that pose a 
marginal threat to the United States—and less of a threat than domestic or-
ganizations specifically targeting Americans.35 Moreover, if the legal divide 
turns on the fear of sophisticated international plots resulting in mass casu-
alties, many individual defendants targeted in “international” cases appear ex 
ante to lack the connections or capabilities to engage in such plots.36 Rather, 
little may separate the young man following ISIS online from his white su-
premacist neighbor posting on the Daily Stormer.37 
 
 29. See infra Section II.B. 
 30. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 31. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 32. See infra Section II.C. 
 33. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 34. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 35. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 36. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 37. The Daily Stormer is a neo-Nazi and white nationalist website that is “arguably the 
leading hate site on the internet.” Luke O’Brien, The Making of an American Nazi, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-making-of-an-
american-nazi/544119/ [https://perma.cc/B6EZ-HTYH]. It encourages followers to meet local-
ly to undertake paramilitary training, and its readers have included Charleston shooter Dylann 
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Thus, none of the three rationales offers a convincing justification for 
the domestic–international divide. But even if some grounds for the legal di-
vide were plausible, there is another reason to reject the division. Processes 
of “othering” immigrant and nonwhite communities—endemic in U.S. his-
tory—suggest that the “international” category will almost inexorably ex-
pand to cover racial, ethnic, or religious communities perceived as a threat, 
even if they have scant connections abroad.38 National security and public 
safety threats sharpen in-group identities against perceived outsiders, leading 
the government and the public to cast out some groups from the national 
community.39 These deep tendencies to separate in-groups from out-groups 
help explain both why the terrorism legal divide is problematic and why it 
persists. 
Some recent public conversation acknowledges the asymmetric ap-
proach to domestic and international terrorism, but then proposes to ad-
dress it by “ratcheting up” the treatment of domestic terrorism through 
enacting new terrorism charges or conferring new coercive powers on law 
enforcement.40 Such an intervention could corrode individual rights without 
protecting communities or achieving equality. Terrorism and security 
 
Roof and others who killed out of racial motives. Id. The name of the website is an allusion to 
Der Stürmer, the anti-Semitic weekly prized by Adolf Hitler. Id. 
 38. See infra Section III.A. 
 39. See infra Section III.A (invidious nature of legal divide). 
 40. See, e.g., Reema Amin, Price, Attorney General Propose Law Aimed at Domestic Ter-
rorism, DAILY PRESS (Jan. 22, 2018, 3:40 PM) (updated Jan. 24, 8:30 PM), 
https://www.dailypress.com/news/newport-news/dp-nws-politics-domestic-terrorism-
20180122-story.html [https://perma.cc/3V2H-ATCF] (describing a Virginia legislative pro-
posal to criminalize association with domestic terrorist groups); Monique Garcia, Illinois Sen-
ate Approves Resolution Asking Police to Recognize Neo-Nazi Groups as Terrorist Organizations, 
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2017, 7:24 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-
illinois-senate-neo-nazi-terrorist-organization-story.html [https://perma.cc/D6LY-3V2R] (de-
scribing an Illinois resolution urging recognition of white nationalist groups as terrorist organ-
izations); Norris, supra note 19, at 292–95 (calling for a new federal terrorism statute); Ryan J. 
Reilly, Domestic Terrorism Isn’t a Federal Crime. DOJ May Try to Change That, HUFFPOST 
(Aug. 16, 2017, 8:08 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/charlottesville-attack-
domestic-terrorism-doj_us_5991eaa2e4b09071f69bb648 [https://perma.cc/ZP7P-USWP] (de-
scribing Justice Department consideration of a new domestic terrorism statute); Ryan J. Reilly 
et al., Americans Are Surprised Domestic Terrorism Isn’t a Federal Crime. Most Think It Should 
Be., HUFFPOST (Apr. 12, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/domestic-
terrorism-federal-law-poll-doj-fbi_us_5acd1c78e4b09212968c8907 [https://perma.cc/TU7F-
72JS] (reporting strong bipartisan support for new federal terrorism statute); Jazmine Ulloa, 
Violence from White Supremacist Groups Should Be Treated as Terrorist Acts, Committee Says, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017, 3:57 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-
essential-politics-updates-california-state-senate-committee-calls-1504046997-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/5LFF-2ADK] (describing California lawmakers’ resolutions to treat white 
nationalist violence as terrorism). Some recent federal bills primarily call for increased data-
gathering, training, and assessment of domestic terrorism, see Domestic Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2018, H.R. 4918, 115th Cong. (2018); Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2017, S. 
2148, 115th Cong. (2017), while other proposals would require financial institutions to freeze 
the assets of those merely suspected of domestic terrorism, see FASTER Act of 2017, H.R. 3747, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
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threats have long challenged civil liberties and democratic governance. Sub-
jecting more people to policies that compromise rights and diminish ac-
countability only magnifies the harm. Moreover, given that race pervades 
criminal justice decisions, new domestic terrorism laws risk threatening Af-
rican Americans protesting police brutality, indigenous rights activists, and 
other historically targeted groups.41 
Instead of ratcheting up the legal treatment of domestic terrorism, poli-
cymakers should restore civil liberties and oversight to the international ter-
rorism legal regime. To begin, Congress or the Court should revisit the ban 
on material support to foreign terrorist organizations, which applies even to 
speech.42 Furthermore, the Justice Department should oversee investigations 
of domestic and international terrorism with equal rigor and rein in the ag-
gressive uses of informants in the latter context.43 The federal government 
should collect and publicize consistent information on terrorism across the 
divide, allowing law enforcement and the public to better understand the 
domestic terrorism threat—and to devote more law enforcement resources 
where existing attention has fallen short.44 In addition, so long as the distinc-
tion survives, institutions like the FISA Court should be required to find a 
substantial connection between individuals and foreign terrorist threats be-
fore treating suspects as “international.”45 Such measures would be a first 
step toward leveling the treatment of political violence across ideologies and 
communities.46 
The Article develops as follows. Part I systematically maps the operation, 
origins, and effects of the legal divide between domestic and international 
terrorism. Part II critiques the primary rationales articulated in defense of 
the distinction: civil liberties, federalism, and the scale of domestic and in-
ternational terrorism targeting the United States. Part III explains how ra-
cialized patterns of “othering” help explain the persistence of the legal divide 
and points the way toward a more equal and less punitive approach. 
 
 41. See infra Section III.C. 
 42. See infra Section III.D. 
 43. See infra Section III.D. 
 44. See infra Section III.C–D. 
 45. See infra Section III.D. 
 46. This Article interrogates legal differences between categories of terrorism under U.S. 
law, and does not purport to answer whether and how the law should distinguish terrorism 
from other crime. In future work, I plan to address how terrorism relates to other offenses, in-
cluding hate crimes, and to trace the evolution of the U.S. legal approach to political violence 
through earlier periods. In addition, while recognizing that the United States deems itself to be 
in armed conflict with a subset of international terrorist groups, this Article does not address 
the legitimacy of military responses to terrorism abroad, focusing instead on the criminal law 
mechanisms almost exclusively used against suspects within the United States. 
May 2019] Separate and Unequal 1343 
I. THE LEGAL DIVIDE BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 
To a significant degree, law enforcement polices, prosecutes, and pun-
ishes terrorism differently according to whether it is considered internation-
al or domestic in nature, even with respect to conduct by U.S. citizens and 
residents within the United States. The law treats international terrorism 
more harshly than domestic terrorism and requires less oversight of law en-
forcement and intelligence activities investigating it. 
The threshold question is what constitutes terrorism. U.S. law has mul-
tiple definitions across and even within agencies.47 A leading definition in 
the federal criminal code identifies terrorism, whether domestic or interna-
tional, as activities that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” 
that violate the criminal law and “appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”48 Other U.S. legal defini-
tions specify whether the targets must be noncombatants, whether the vio-
lence must be premeditated, and whether acts against property qualify.49 For 
present purposes, when not referring to a specific legal definition, this Arti-
cle applies the term to violence or the threat of violence used in pursuit of a 
political objective. This definition accords with most U.S. legal definitions 
and prevailing academic usage in requiring a political or ideological mo-
tive.50 It thus excludes violent acts stemming from personal grievances even 
if they victimize large numbers of people or provoke widespread fear. 
The dividing line between domestic and international terrorism—and 
the consequences of the division—varies across legal contexts. The differ-
ences are sharpest with respect to surveillance and the use of material sup-
port charges. By contrast, some investigative and regulatory mechanisms, 
like terrorist watchlist systems, make little formal distinction between do-
mestic and international terrorism.51 Even where the law is formally neutral, 
however, the prevalence of the distinction in other laws administered by the 
same agencies may reinforce a bifurcated approach to terrorism—where ter-
rorism is conceptualized and treated more harshly when committed by Mus-
lims. 
 
 47. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 32–36 (3d ed. 2017) (distinguishing lead-
ing U.S. legal definitions). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2012) (defining international terrorism); id. § 2331(5) (defining 
domestic terrorism). 
 49. HOFFMAN, supra note 47, at 31–33. 
 50. See id. at 2–3, 31 (noting that terrorism is political under most standard conceptions 
and citing legal definitions that refer to “politically motivated violence,” the use of force or vio-
lence “in furtherance of political or social objectives,” and the “pursuit of goals that are gener-
ally political, religious, or ideological objectives”). 
 51. See infra Section I.A.2. 
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This Part maps the legal divide in the investigation, prosecution, and 
sentencing of terrorism. Across these contexts, the discussion demonstrates 
two related phenomena: first, the existence of different legal standards for 
domestic and international terrorism; and second, the elastic application of 
the international category to U.S. Muslims with limited international con-
nections. Part II.B traces the historical origins of the terrorism divide. Part 
II.C shows how the terrorism divide contributes to a racialized understand-
ing of terrorism and reinforces discriminatory policies. 
A. The Operation of the Divide 
1. Electronic Surveillance 
If law enforcement officials suspect an individual within the United 
States of connections to “international terrorism,” they can ask the FISA 
Court for permission to wiretap the person’s phone or email under a rela-
tively permissive standard and with little oversight.52 By contrast, if officials 
suspect a person has links to “domestic terrorism,” they must persuade a 
judge to authorize the wiretap surveillance under the conventional probable 
cause standard used in criminal cases.53 
Unlike the conventional criminal standard, FISA does not require prob-
able cause that a crime has been, or will be, committed. Instead, it requires 
probable cause that the surveillance target is a “foreign power” or an “agent 
of a foreign power.”54 A foreign power includes “a group engaged in interna-
tional terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”55 According to a lead-
ing treatise, a group need not be formally designated as a terrorist 
organization to qualify as a foreign power and can include as few as two 
people engaged in international terrorism.56 Agents of foreign powers in-
clude those who knowingly engage in, or aid and abet, international terror-
ism or preparatory activities “for or on behalf of” foreign powers.57 Thus, 
 
 52. For a description of the FISA Court, see generally Emily Berman, The Two Faces of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191, 1192 (2016). In addition to elec-
tronic surveillance, FISA Court jurisdiction over individual targets extends to physical search-
es, the capture of metadata through “pen register” and “trap-and-trace” devices, and business 
records and other “tangible things.” Id. at 1197. 
 53. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, 2 NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS 
& PROSECUTIONS 2D 264 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that the federal wiretapping statute, Title III, 
would be used for wiretapping groups engaged in domestic terrorism). The conventional fed-
eral standard for wiretapping comes from Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 54. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2012). The statute also requires that the surveillance be 
aimed at places used by the foreign power or an agent. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(B). 
 55. Id. § 1801(a)(4). 
 56. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 265. 
 57. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C), (E). 
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this definition excludes supporters of groups engaged in entirely domestic 
activities.58 
In addition, for individuals who are not U.S. citizens or legal permanent 
residents, the statute dispenses with the requirement that there be any con-
nection to a foreign group. The 2004 “lone wolf” amendment to FISA au-
thorized surveillance of unaffiliated individuals engaging in international 
terrorism or preparatory activities,59 and Congress has reauthorized that 
controversial provision several times.60 The government has reportedly nev-
er used the lone wolf provision and has relied instead on its ability to 
demonstrate a connection to international terrorist groups.61 
Like federal judges reviewing conventional wiretapping requests, FISA 
judges approve warrants ex parte after reviewing the evidence supporting the 
government’s probable cause determination.62 In addition, FISA applications 
require internal approval by the attorney general or a deputy before submis-
sion to the FISA Court.63 But in several respects, FISA orders are broader 
than conventional wiretapping orders and provide for less oversight. First, 
the duration of FISA surveillance is longer: the statute authorizes surveil-
lance of U.S. citizens and permanent residents for 90 days and other individ-
uals for 120 days before the government must request an extension,64 as 
opposed to 30 days under the federal criminal standard.65 Second, unlike the 
conventional federal requirement, the government does not notify targets of 
the surveillance after it ends except where it seeks to use the evidence in a 
criminal or other proceeding.66 
 
 58. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 264 (“A group engaged in ‘terrorism of a pure-
ly domestic nature’ would not qualify as an international terrorist group.” (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 30 (1978))). 
 59. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C)). The provision includes 
within the definition of an “agent of a foreign power” a non-U.S. person who “engages in in-
ternational terrorism or activities in preparation therefore [sic].” Id. 
 60. See Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It and Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused Counter-
terrorism Laws and Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 677, 696 (2012) (noting repeated congressional reauthorization). 
 61. Id. at 721 (describing nonuse of the provision); see also Shane Harris, The Patriot 
Act May Be Dead Forever, DAILY BEAST (May 28, 2015, 8:00 PM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/the-patriot-act-may-be-dead-forever [https://perma.cc/5NVN-
ZFKW] (referencing an FBI spokesperson’s statement that the agency has established connec-
tions to terrorist groups in all cases). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2012). Eleven judges, selected by the 
Chief Justice from among district court judges, serve on the FISA Court. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1803(a)(1). 
 63. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737–42 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(finding differences between FISA and Title III to have little constitutional relevance). 
 64. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). 
 66. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741 (distinguishing notice under Title III from that 
under FISA). Note that while federal law requires notification of suspects following the inter-
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Third, even where the government provides notice of FISA surveillance, 
defendants have a limited ability to contest its legality. While defendants 
have a Fourth Amendment right to suppress evidence derived from search 
warrants issued because of untruthful police affidavits,67 they have no right 
to access the government’s application to the FISA Court, making it virtually 
impossible to challenge the lawfulness of the warrant.68 In 2014, in the case 
of Adel Daoud, a mentally unstable nineteen-year-old who attempted to 
bomb a Chicago bar in an FBI sting operation, a federal appeals court over-
turned the first-ever court order requiring disclosure of a FISA application.69 
The court denied disclosure despite a government admission that seventy-
five past terrorism-related FISA applications had “contained misstatements 
and omissions of material facts.”70 Thus, FISA limits a defendant’s rights at 
trial and undercuts deterrence of law enforcement misconduct. 
Moreover, FISA creates a nebulous dividing line between domestic and 
international terrorism. “International terrorism” encompasses activities ei-
ther that “occur totally outside the United States” or that “transcend national 
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the per-
sons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which 
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”71 This definition is expansive: a 
leading treatise by the former head of the Justice Department National Secu-
rity Division suggests that domestic activities conducted with the intent to 
influence a global audience would qualify, since the persons they appear “in-
tended to ‘coerce or intimidate’ ” transcend national boundaries.72 
 
ception, state law may not necessarily require it. See Helen B. Shaffer, Wiretapping in Law En-
forcement, 1961 EDITORIAL RES. REP., http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/
cqresrre1961110900 [https://perma.cc/Z27M-EF9X]. 
 67. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978) (requiring exclusion of evidence 
derived from search where defendant establishes that search warrant affidavit contained a false 
statement made “knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” and 
where affidavit could not otherwise provide sufficient basis for probable cause). 
 68. See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 490 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rovner, J., concur-
ring) (observing that FISA defendants “face an obvious and virtually insurmountable obstacle” 
in making “a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate or reckless material falsehoods or 
omissions in the FISA application without having access to the application itself”). 
 69. Id. at 480–81, 485. In 2016, a federal judge declared the defendant, Adel Daoud, 
mentally unfit for trial after noting that “his belief in the Illuminati, the Freemasons and lizard 
people is sincere and escalating.” Jason Meisner, Suspect in Terrorism Plot to Bomb Loop Bar 
Found Mentally Fit for Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:20 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-terrorism-suspect-fit-for-trial-
20180313-story.html [https://perma.cc/9WMF-554R]. In 2018, after a government psychiatrist 
found that Daoud had been rehabilitated by his psychiatric treatment, both sides agreed that 
Daoud was now stable enough to stand trial. Id. 
 70. Daoud, 755 F.3d at 491 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
 71. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(3) (2012). 
 72. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 294 (“The definition’s third prong reaches ter-
rorist groups whose acts of terrorism are intended to ‘coerce or intimidate’ foreign govern-
ments or populations, even if, at the moment that the government seeks FISA authorization . . . 
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In a recent law review comment exploring FISA’s dividing line, Nick 
Harper argues that the government may have adopted a “greatly relaxed in-
terpretation of the international-nexus requirement.”73 In two cases involv-
ing U.S. Muslims charged with plotting attacks on military facilities inside 
the United States, the international activity appeared to consist only of post-
ing videos and writing comments on various international platforms via 
YouTube or seeking a religious opinion in support of an intended attack.74 
Unsurprisingly, given limited published case law from the FISA Court and 
FISA Court of Review as a whole, no public decision analyzes the interna-
tional nexus requirement.75 
There are some indications that the government selectively applies a 
broad definition of international terrorism to threats related to Islamic ex-
tremism. Michael Leiter, former director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center, has stated that acts by a person “born, raised, and basically every-
thing here in the U.S.” can be labeled international terrorism if they are mo-
tivated by a “transnational ideology.”76 He further explained: 
What the intelligence and law enforcement communities in the U.S. say, 
and this has been something accepted by Congress, is that simply being 
motivated by trans-nationalist ideology that is violent Sunni extremism and 
embodied by ISIS or al Qaeda, make something international terrorism. 
There is always a sufficient nexus back to those international groups even if 
an individual is simply motivated by them, and there is no direct commu-
nication.77 
FISA secrecy makes it difficult to determine how the government or 
court interprets the international nexus criterion and whether they consist-
ently determine the existence of a nexus across ideologies.78 In other con-
 
the group has not engaged in any action outside of the United States or that transcends nation-
al boundaries.”). 
 73. Harper, supra note 20, at 1144. 
 74. Id. at 1144–49. 
 75. Id. at 1138. 
 76. Michael Leiter, ‘Muddy Distinctions’ Between International, Domestic Terror, 
CIPHER BRIEF (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/muddy-distinctions-
international-domestic-terror (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 77. Id. Leiter observes that “September 11 and the subsequent rise of homegrown ter-
rorism has really muddled the traditional line between international terrorism and domestic 
terrorism,” and acknowledges that even right-wing violence in the United States has “potential 
international linkages” because domestic groups “get motivation and encouragement from 
their counterparts internationally.” Id. Leiter did not specify the areas of law he was referring 
to, or how Congress has approved it. 
 78. Because the government is required to notify criminal defendants when it intends to 
use FISA evidence in criminal cases, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(d) (2012), further research could exam-
ine the factual predicates in a broader set of cases where the government has notified defend-
ants of FISA use. Even that investigation would be limited, however, as it would only factor in 
cases that have led to prosecution and where the government has complied with disclosure ob-
ligations. See Patrick C. Toomey, Why Aren’t Criminal Defendants Getting Notice of Section 
702 Surveillance—Again?, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/28256/
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texts, government agencies classify white supremacists as domestic terrorist 
threats,79 despite international contacts and influences, raising the possibility 
that threats related to Islam are selectively deemed transnational.80 
Beyond the definition of “international terrorism,” the FISA definition 
of agency may also pull in U.S. individuals with limited connections abroad. 
Leaving aside the lone wolf provision, FISA requires that a person act “for or 
on behalf of” a group involved in international terrorism.81 But the court 
might interpret a person inspired by ISIS to be acting “for or on behalf of” 
the group, even if she had no contact with the group. In fact, because FISA 
permits the classification of a group of two people engaged in international 
terrorism as a foreign power,82 a U.S. citizen could qualify as an agent so 
long as she conspired to support international terrorism with one other per-
son. All this might explain why the government has never used the lone wolf 
provision; with such broad definitions of international terrorism and agents 
of a foreign power, it would rarely need to.83 In sum, FISA subjects interna-
tional terrorism to broader and less accountable surveillance and may apply 
to Islamic extremist activities with marginal international connections. 
 
arent-criminal-defendants-notice-section-702-surveillance-again/ [https://perma.cc/86B7-
7UEB] (describing the government’s narrow construction of notification requirements with 
respect to certain surveillance programs). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 59 (2006) (iden-
tifying “animal rights extremists, eco-terrorists, anarchists, anti-government extremists such as 
‘sovereign citizens’ and unauthorized militias, Black separatists, White supremacists, and anti-
abortion extremists” as domestic terrorism threats). 
 80. Despite the predominant conception of white supremacist threats as domestic, indi-
vidual right-wing terrorists in both the United States and Europe have found transnational 
inspiration. For instance, Dylann Roof, the Charleston shooter, sported South African and 
Rhodesian flags on his clothing, while Norwegian right-wing terrorist Anders Breivik, who 
killed more than seventy people in 2011, was a registered user of the Stormfront white nation-
alist website founded by a former U.S. Klan leader. Morris Dees & J. Richard Cohen, Opinion, 
White Supremacists Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/22/opinion/white-supremacists-without-borders.html [https://perma.cc/462R-
HVCJ]. Dees and Cohen report that U.S. white nationalists traveled abroad more than thirty 
times in a two-year period to strengthen international connections. Id.; see also Natasha Ber-
trand, ‘A Model for Civilization’: Putin’s Russia Has Emerged as ‘a Beacon for Nationalists’ and 
the American Alt-Right, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2016, 9:29 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/russia-connections-to-the-alt-right-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/
SE2K-V9YT] (describing travel between United States and Europe, especially Russia, of white 
nationalist leaders). 
 81. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C). 
 82. Id. § 1801(a)(4). 
 83. Robert Chesney, Why Is the Lone Wolf FISA Provision Never Used? And Just How 
Broad Is the FISC Understanding of Group Agency?, LAWFARE (June 3, 2015, 2:13 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-lone-wolf-fisa-provision-never-used-and-just-how-broad-
fisc-understanding-group-agency [https://perma.cc/U2RG-FHQK]. 
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2. Other Investigative Mechanisms 
Law enforcement officials use two other far-reaching investigative tools 
in international terrorism cases that are off-limits for domestic terrorism. 
First, the FBI can apply to the FISA Court for Section 215 orders to access 
business records, tax returns, educational records, phone records, or other 
“tangible things” in investigations to “protect against international terror-
ism.”84 Pursuant to the Patriot Act, Section 215 orders require only a mini-
mal showing that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the records 
are relevant to an authorized investigation.85 For instance, the statute pre-
sumptively allows the government to seize the records of any person “known 
to” an individual suspected of being an agent of a foreign power, even if 
there is nothing suspicious about the person whose records are sought.86 
Second, the FBI can issue National Security Letters (NSLs) to acquire 
records from electronic communications providers, consumer reporting 
agencies, and financial institutions without judicial approval.87 The NSL 
statutes require the government to certify that the records are sought for a 
national security investigation, which is defined to include investigations of 
international terrorism but exclude purely domestic terrorism.88 Shortly af-
ter 9/11, the Justice Department drafted a “boilerplate paragraph” for field 
offices to insert into NSLs to meet the certification requirements,89 and by 
2004, the FBI issued tens of thousands of NSLs a year.90 
While federal agencies can access similar records in domestic terrorism 
cases, the legal tools to do so generally require less secrecy or a higher legal 
standard. For example, when federal officials use grand jury subpoenas ra-
ther than NSLs to acquire records, the recipients are not generally bound by 
gag orders preventing them from disclosing the subpoenas.91 The very pro-
 
 84. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1); id. § 1861(a)(3) (requiring higher-level FBI approval for ac-
quisition of certain records including library records, tax returns, educational records, and 
medical records). The definition of international terrorism in question likely tracks the defini-
tion used elsewhere in FISA. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 696–97 (explaining that “it 
would make little sense for either the government or the FISA Court to use any other defini-
tion of these terms in applying FISA’s tangible-things provision”). 
 85. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 86. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 694, 698–99. 
 87. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 728–29 (discussing five applicable NSL statutes). 
 88. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(5)(A) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(5) (2012); id. § 1681v(a); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709(b)(1) (2012); KRIS & WILSON, supra note 53, at 730. 
 89. Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1116 (2006). 
 90. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND 
LIBERTY 241, 249 (2008). 
 91. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); Michael German et al., National Security Letters: Build-
ing Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_i
nvestigations_or_intrusive_t/ [https://perma.cc/THZ6-YNAB]. 
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cess of convening a grand jury may also deter prosecutorial overuse.92 Simi-
larly, while the Stored Communications Act permits the government to ob-
tain customer information and phone call metadata in conventional criminal 
cases, orders under that provision require “specific and articulable facts” 
connecting the records to an ongoing criminal investigation, a higher show-
ing than Section 215 orders.93 
Other investigative mechanisms do not distinguish as sharply between 
domestic and international terrorism. For instance, terrorist watchlists in-
clude individuals suspected of domestic or international terrorism,94 and 
Justice Department guidelines allow the FBI to conduct far-reaching enter-
prise investigations of groups in either category.95 Justice Department guide-
lines do, however, require less oversight over informants in international 
terrorism investigations than in other contexts, allowing the FBI to use spe-
cial and long-term informants without the approval of a special committee 
of Justice Department and FBI attorneys.96 Many have suggested that the FBI 
 
 92. On the other hand, the attorney general’s guidelines governing the FBI permit Sec-
tion 215 orders and NSLs only in preliminary investigations, which require “information or an 
allegation indicating the existence” of a crime or national security threat, while grand jury sub-
poenas are available without factual predication. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 17–18, 20–21 (2008) [hereinafter 
MUKASEY GUIDELINES]. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (d); see also In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring 
Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2014 WL 5463290, at *4–
5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (comparing Section 215 orders to 18 U.S.C. § 2703). While the FISA 
Court noted that Section 215 orders provide for more back-end judicial review than Section 
2703 orders, it acknowledged that no Section 215 order recipient had ever challenged the legal-
ity of the order. Id. at *4–5. 
 94. The Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watchlist—used for screening indi-
viduals for visas, air travel, and entry into the United States—includes individuals suspected of 
either domestic or international terrorism, and the smaller No Fly List bars from air travel in-
dividuals who represent a threat of either international or domestic terrorism. NAT’L 
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE 33, 51 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/March%202013%20Watchlist%20Guidance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2X5M-4EVW]. The watchlists condition certain substantive and procedural protec-
tions on citizenship and immigration status. See id. at 10, 18, 34. 
 95. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 92, at 23, 42–43. Such investigations require “an 
articulable factual basis” reasonably indicating that a “group or organization may have engaged 
or may be engaged in . . . planning or preparation or provision of support” for, among other 
things, “international terrorism . . . or other threat to the national security,” or “domestic ter-
rorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) as “involving a violation of federal criminal law.” Id. 
at 23. Because federal criminal law does not cover all domestic terrorism, this investigative au-
thority is somewhat more limited for domestic terrorism, but the difference might not be sig-
nificant because the required degree of suspicion is so low. 
 96. A set of 2006 guidelines, approved by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, applies to 
the FBI’s use of confidential informants. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES 1 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter GONZALES GUIDELINES], https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/ag-guidelines-use-
of-fbi-chs.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBN7-NNT8]. In 2008, the guidelines were revised to remove 
separate references to international terrorism, in favor of “national security.” OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN., ORDER NO. 3019-2008, CONFORMING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
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investigates U.S. Muslim communities more aggressively than others, in-
cluding through the pervasive use of informants.97 The relaxed oversight of 
international terrorism investigations may contribute to this differential 
treatment. 
Moreover, the FBI’s definitions of domestic and international terrorism 
facilitate the classification of threats along ideological lines.98 Its website de-
fines international terrorism as “inspired by or associated with designated 
foreign terrorist organizations or nations” and offers the San Bernardino 
shooters as an example because they were “inspired” by foreign organiza-
tions.99 The website defines domestic terrorism as “inspired by or associated 
with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a 
political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”100 These defini-
tions thus treat “inspiration” alone as a sufficient link to international terror-
ism, and exclude Muslim suspects from the “domestic” category so long as 
the FBI does not consider Islamic extremism a “primarily U.S.-based move-
ment.”101 
 
GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-conforming-order.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3JF-
YYKP]. But the 2006 guidelines’ definition of “national security investigation” remains inter-
nationally focused, including “international terrorism,” espionage for or on behalf of foreign 
powers, foreign computer intrusions, and matters consistent with E.O. 12333, but not domestic 
terrorism. GONZALES GUIDELINES, supra at 7; MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 92, at 45. The 
2006 guidelines require that, in non–national security cases, the use of “special” informants 
(such as those in a high-level position within organizations) and “long-term” informants 
(those registered for more than five consecutive years) be approved by a Human Source Re-
view Committee set up by the FBI and Justice Department Criminal Division. GONZALES 
GUIDELINES, supra at 18–19. That committee includes attorneys from the FBI’s Office of Gen-
eral Counsel and the Criminal Division, and must arrive at a consensus decision to approve the 
use of informants. Id. In national security investigations, however, the FBI has authority to ap-
prove the continued use of special and long-term informants and need only notify the National 
Security Division of its decision. Id. at 20. A 2015 internal FBI guide on confidential human 
sources leaked by The Intercept is consistent with the Gonzalez Guidelines in its treatment of 
informants in the national security context. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCE POLICY GUIDE 46–47 (2015); Confidential Human Source Pol-
icy Guide, INTERCEPT (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:22 AM), https://theintercept.com/document/
2017/01/31/confidential-human-source-policy-guide/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 97. E.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra note 373 and accompanying text. 
 98.  See What We Investigate: Terrorism, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism [https://perma.cc/8CFT-HDPC]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Although the website defines terrorism as either domestic or international—a binary 
categorization—it also refers to “Homegrown Violent Extremists,” which appears to be a sub-
set of the international category. Id. These are defined as “global-jihad-inspired individuals 
who are based in the U.S., have been radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not directly col-
laborating with a foreign terrorist organization.” Id. 
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3. Federal Prosecution 
Federal authorities prosecute a significant number of both international 
and domestic terrorism cases,102 and a large number of federal criminal 
charges can apply to terrorism with or without international links.103 But in 
part because of differences in the coverage of federal terrorism statutes, a 
criminal defendant suspected of terrorism is more likely to be charged in 
federal, rather than state, court if the terrorism is viewed as “internation-
al.”104 
While there is no single federal crime called terrorism, Chapter 113B of 
the U.S. criminal code lists offenses deemed related to terrorism and defines 
an even wider variety of offenses as “[f]ederal crime[s] of terrorism.”105 
These crimes fall into three general categories. The first category covers of-
fenses committed with particular weapons—such as chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons or more common explosives106—and tactics historical-
ly associated with terrorism, such as taking hostages or hijacking aircraft.107 
As a result of this category of offenses, federal jurisdiction sometimes turns 
on the choice of weapon. In particular, an assailant who used a bomb would 
fall within various federal terrorism statutes, while a suspect using a gun 
might not.108 The second category specifies targets of the violence where 
 
 102. Domestic Terrorism Prosecutions Outnumber International, TRAC REP. (Sept. 21, 
2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/481/ [https://perma.cc/ZM6U-YTKF] (reporting 
223 federal international terrorism prosecutions and 404 domestic terrorism prosecutions 
from 2013–2017). These numbers are difficult to assess because it is often not clear how prose-
cutors have defined or classified cases as international or domestic. 
 103. MICHAEL GERMAN & SARA ROBINSON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WRONG 
PRIORITIES ON FIGHTING TERRORISM 5–14 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2018_10_DomesticTerrorism_V2%20%281%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X392-EGEA] (listing federal offenses that can be used to prosecute domestic 
terrorism, including terrorism-specific charges, hate crimes charges, and more general federal 
criminal charges). 
 104. See, e.g., Neiwert, supra note 12 (using original database of terrorism incidents from 
2008 to 2016 to conclude that “federal charges of some kind were filed in 91 percent of the Is-
lamist incidents that led to arrests” while “federal prosecutors handled 60 percent of far-right 
cases, leaving many in the hands of state or local authorities”). 
 105. See 18 U.S.C. ch. 113B (2012) (“Terrorism”); id. § 2332b(g)(5) (defining a federal 
crime of terrorism as “an offense” that “is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of gov-
ernment by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” and that 
violates any of approximately fifty listed statutes). 
 106. See, e.g., id. § 229 (acquisition, production, use, or possession of chemical weapons); 
id. § 831 (“Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials”); id. § 832 (“Participation in 
nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States”); id. § 844(i) (destruc-
tion or damage to property used in interstate commerce “by means of fire or an explosive”); id. 
§ 2332a (“Use of weapons of mass destruction”); id. § 2332i (“Acts of nuclear terrorism”). 
 107. See, e.g., id. § 1203 (“Hostage taking”); id. § 32 (“Destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
facilities”). 
 108. See Hennessey, supra note 21 (arguing that the “legal treatment of homegrown vio-
lent extremists and domestic terrorists” depends most on “whether the crime involves a bomb 
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there is a distinct federal interest, such as violence against federal officials, 
federal facilities, and mass transit or communications systems.109 The third 
category comprises crimes with an international nexus, defined variously ac-
cording to the statute in question.110 
 This third category of federal terrorism offenses exposes defendants 
who have, or who are thought to have, more international connections to a 
higher likelihood of federal prosecution. The most significant of these charg-
es—providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organiza-
tions—is considered separately in the next section. Other charges include 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b, which criminalizes murder, serious assaults, and property 
damage risking serious injury within the United States where there is “con-
duct transcending national boundaries.”111 That provision converts violent 
acts—as well as threats, attempts, and conspiracies to commit such acts—
into federal crimes where there is an international link, irrespective of politi-
cal intent.112 Moreover, marginal international connections may satisfy the 
“transcending national boundaries” requirement in the statute. For instance, 
one court approved the Section 2332b conviction of a Massachusetts man 
who conspired with other local individuals to murder another U.S. national 
within the United States, where the international conduct consisted only of a 
coconspirator’s online communications with overseas ISIS members about 
the potential crime.113 
With respect to state prosecutions, many states have terrorism laws on 
the books114 but rarely use them.115 Therefore, in practice, state-level prose-
 
or a gun”); see also Chong, supra note 21 (discussing “gun-crime/bomb-terrorism binary” as a 
product of U.S. terrorism definitions). 
 109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351 (assassination, kidnapping, or assault of members of Con-
gress, Supreme Court, and Cabinet); id. § 1114 (“Protection of officers and employees of the 
United States”); id. § 930(c) (killing during an attack in a federal facility involving a firearm or 
dangerous weapon); id. § 1751 (assault, kidnapping, or assassination of president or presiden-
tial staff); id. § 844(f)(2)–(3) (damage or destruction to federal properties causing or risking 
death or injury); id. § 1362 (“Communication lines, stations or systems”); id. § 1992 (attacks on 
railroads and mass transportation systems); id. § 2332f (“Bombings of places of public use, 
government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities”). 
 110. See, e.g., id. § 2332 (killing a U.S. national outside the United States); id. § 2332b 
(“Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries”); id. § 956(a)(1) (conspiracy to kill or 
injure persons abroad); id. § 2339B (material support to foreign terrorist organizations). 
 111. Id. § 2332b(a)(1). Other jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied. Id. 
§ 2332b(b). To be clear, this statutory charge does not appear to be a numerically significant 
driver of the greater federal prosecution of Muslim defendants, since available evidence sug-
gests that use of this statute is rare, at least with respect to ISIS terrorism cases. CTR. ON NAT’L 
SEC., FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION 29 (2017). 
 112. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(2) (including threats, attempts, and conspiracies). The 
statute elliptically defines “conduct transcending national boundaries” as “conduct occurring 
outside of the United States in addition to the conduct occurring in the United States.” Id. 
§ 2332b(g)(1). 
 113. United States v. Wright, 285 F. Supp. 3d 443, 460–61 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 114. Donna Lyons, States Enact New Terrorism Crimes and Penalties, NCSL ST. LEGIS. 
REP., Nov. 2002, at 1–3. 
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cutions for conduct that could be classified as terrorism generally proceed 
using conventional criminal charges. While local authorities principally 
handle domestic rather than international cases, they have occasionally pros-
ecuted individuals inspired by ISIS or other foreign organizations.116 It ap-
pears that federal authorities deferred to the states in these (unusual) cases 
because state law offered broader conspiracy charges, the ability to charge a 
minor as an adult, or other features making conviction more certain or con-
sequential.117 The greater federal role in international terrorism prosecutions 
thus produces several notable consequences. First, concurrent federal and 
state jurisdiction enables federal prosecutors to “forum shop” for the juris-
diction more likely to convict and impose a severe sentence. Indeed, federal 
guidelines advise prosecutors to choose between federal and state proceed-
ings in part based on the likely punishment.118 Second, federal prosecution 
exposes defendants to federal terrorism sentencing enhancements and the 
federal death penalty—discussed further below.119 And third, uneven feder-
alization may direct greater federal resources and public attention to interna-
tional terrorism. 
4. Material Support Charges 
Material support to terrorism laws supply some of the most common—
and controversial—charges in federal terrorism cases.120 But they do not ap-
 
 115. Lisa Daniels, Prosecuting Terrorism in State Court, LAWFARE (Oct. 26, 2016, 11:33 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-terrorism-state-court [https://perma.cc/
VP7A-GFXC]; see also INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING, supra note 3, at nn.98–100 
and accompanying text. (describing state prosecutions on terrorism charges as uncommon 
based on report’s dataset). 
 116. Daniels, supra note 115. 
 117. Id. (collecting examples). In a recent case, the federal government ceded the prose-
cution of a seventeen-year-old allegedly plotting an ISIS-inspired shooting to the state of Tex-
as, because state law permitted his prosecution as an adult. Valerie Wigglesworth, Plano Teen 
Arrested in ISIS-Inspired Plot to Commit Mass Shooting at Frisco’s Stonebriar Mall, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS (May 2, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2018/05/02/plano-
teen-arrested-isis-inspired-plot-commit-mass-shooting-local-mall [https://perma.cc/CNG2-
Y7X8]; see also William K. Rashbaum & Joseph Goldstein, Informer’s Role in Terror Case Is 
Said to Have Deterred F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/22/nyregion/for-jose-pimentel-bomb-plot-suspect-an-online-trail.html [https://perma.cc/
E9EZ-EWL9] (suggesting that federal authorities avoided case because of informant’s conduct 
and noting that state law permitted charging of a conspiracy between defendant and informant 
alone). 
 118. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, §§ 9-2.301, 9-27.240 (2018) [hereinaf-
ter JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/title-9-criminal [https://perma.cc/5LQZ-
R68X]. 
 119. See infra Section I.A.5. 
 120. See SAID, supra note 5, at 51 (characterizing § 2339B as “the most important statute 
employed in terrorism prosecutions”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 62–63 (find-
ing that material support charges constituted the “largest share of convictions” based on analy-
sis of 494 international terrorism-related cases from September 11, 2001 through 2011); Robert 
M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 
May 2019] Separate and Unequal 1355 
ply equally to domestic and international terrorism. A key material support 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, prohibits support to designated foreign terror-
ist organizations and therefore excludes domestic terrorism on its face. The 
other significant charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, is not limited to international 
terrorism, but its statutory predicates make it somewhat more available in 
international cases, and in practice, federal prosecutors rarely apply it to 
domestic terrorism.121 
In its current form, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prohibits the provision of “mate-
rial support or resources” to a designated foreign terrorist organization 
where a person knows that the organization is designated or that it has en-
gaged in terrorism.122 In consultation with the treasury secretary and the at-
torney general, the secretary of state designates organizations upon finding 
that an organization is foreign, has engaged in “terrorist activity” or has the 
capacity and intent to do so, and threatens U.S. security or U.S. nationals.123 
Congress passed the provision to cut off financial support for foreign 
terrorist organizations, but since 9/11, the government has used the charge 
extensively against individuals who join, train with, or act on ostensible be-
half of designated organizations.124 In some cases, the government has pros-
ecuted individuals for political and religious speech deemed to be 
coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations, such as a Massachusetts 
man’s translation of pro-jihad tracts for a website allegedly linked to al 
Qaeda.125 
Apart from the broad scope of material support, several features of 
§ 2339B allow the government to use it expansively. First, as compared with 
other inchoate crimes such as attempt or conspiracy, the charge does not re-
quire a connection to a specific act of violence or a specific intent to advance 
the organization’s illegal goals.126 Some broad criminal statutes are “saved” 
by a high mens rea requirement. But here, liability attaches to knowing sup-
port of a designated group, whatever the purpose behind that support. 
 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19–20, 26–28 (2005) (describing escalating use of material support charg-
es and post-9/11 shift to preventative approach to terrorism); Domestic Terrorism Prosecutions 
Outnumber International, supra note 102 (stating that § 2339B was the most commonly filed 
lead charge in federal terrorism cases in 2017). 
 121. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
 123. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2012). 
 124. See SAID, supra note 5, at 53; Chesney, supra note 120, at 2, 15–18, 45–46. 
 125. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding material support 
conviction of Boston man on separate grounds); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding constitutionality of material support statute as applied to plain-
tiffs’ activities of training designated terrorist organizations in international law and engaging 
in political advocacy on their behalf); Akbar, supra note 5, at 828–32 (describing prosecutions 
for political and religious speech in relationship to material support charges). 
 126. See SAID, supra note 5, at 64 (describing 2004 amendment to clarify mens rea re-
quired). 
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Second, because prosecutors can charge individuals with attempt or 
conspiracy to violate § 2339B, they can apply it to scenarios even further re-
moved from violence—for instance, scenarios where individuals agreed with 
others to travel abroad to join a terrorist group but did not actually do so.127 
Indeed, attempt or conspiracy to provide material support are exceedingly 
common charges in international terrorism cases.128 
Third, the use of the charge operates in conjunction with the FBI’s ex-
tensive use of informants to encourage—and arguably entrap—individuals 
in pursuing terrorist plots.129 Undercover agents or government informants 
can create the statutorily required connection to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion by guiding individuals to support a specific group. Informants often 
claim to act on behalf of various foreign groups despite a suspect’s lack of 
prior relationship to those groups.130 Thus, the § 2339B charge enables law 
enforcement to transform apparent sympathy for terrorism into criminal 
acts on the purported behalf of designated groups. 
By contrast, federal law criminalizes support to domestic organizations 
engaged in illegal activity only where that support crosses the line into at-
tempt or conspiracy to commit some other crime,131 or where it meets the 
 
 127. Liability for conspiracy usually attaches when individuals have the intent to commit 
an unlawful act and agree with others to commit that act. Some conspiracy laws also require 
proof of an overt act or concrete step in support of the conspiracy. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41223, FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 8 (2016). 
 128. See Akbar, supra note 5, at 829 (describing frequent combination of material sup-
port and conspiracy charges). 
 129. See id. at 843 (arguing that “a growing number of high-profile prosecutions that fea-
ture a violent terrorist plot—the majority, it seems—rely on government informants that en-
courage, design, or facilitate the plots”); see also CTR. ON NAT’L SEC., supra note 111, at 24, 28 
(finding that 61 percent of ISIS-related prosecutions from 2014 to 2017 involved undercover 
agents or informants and that ISIS cases were primarily prosecuted under material support 
charges). 
 130. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 39–40 (describing FBI inform-
ant’s pretense to act in support of Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistani terrorist group, despite sus-
pect’s lack of prior relationship to the group). 
 131. While the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enables fed-
eral prosecutors to target either foreign or domestic terrorist organizations as criminal enter-
prises, material support charges under § 2339B go further than RICO charges in several 
respects. RICO amplifies criminal penalties against individuals involved with a criminal enter-
prise and allows for broad asset forfeiture. Unlike § 2339B, however, RICO applies to acts that 
already violate state or federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (listing prohibited activities); id. 
§ 1961(1) (defining “racketeering activity” prohibited). Therefore, it does not criminalize oth-
erwise legal support to an organization. In addition, RICO does not reach isolated criminal 
acts, but only applies to a “pattern of racketeering activity,” which requires commission of two 
or more criminal acts within a ten-year period. Id. § 1961(c); id. § 1961(5). Furthermore, the 
Court has interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1862(c), which prohibits conduct and participation in an 
organization’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, to require that a person “have 
some part in directing those affairs.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). Thus, 
RICO does not reach domestic terrorism in an equivalent manner to § 2339B. Note also that, 
while some states have created material support to terrorism offenses, most of these statutes 
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more demanding intent requirement of a second material support charge. 
That second material support offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, criminalizes mate-
rial support where an individual knows or intends that it will be used to 
commit, or prepare to commit, an enumerated federal terrorism offense.132 
Thus, it requires a connection to terrorist activities rather than organiza-
tions.133 
While Section 2339A does not exclude domestic terrorism, its statutory 
predicates replicate the selective reach of federal terrorism law. For instance, 
the charge applies to material support for a mass shooting or vehicular attack 
“transcending national boundaries,” but it might not reach material support 
for similar acts committed without an international nexus.134 
Scott Sullivan’s recent empirical research finds that, between 2012 and 
2017, nearly all of the forty-five indictments on § 2339A charges involved 
individuals perceived to sympathize with “self-proclaimed Islamist militants 
abroad.”135 Sullivan argues that federal prosecutors do not use § 2339A 
charges in other cases even where the facts and the law might have supported 
such a charge.136 For instance, in a recent case where prosecutors charged an 
anti-government extremist in “a truck bomb plot evocative of Timothy 
McVeigh’s attack on the federal building in Oklahoma City,” they might also 
have charged his associates with material support for assisting in the plot.137 
Thus, the lopsided use of § 2339A against Muslim suspects likely results 
from some combination of statutory availability and other factors. In addi-
tion to the popular association of terrorism with Muslims, those factors may 
include a tendency to identify material support charges, in general, with in-
ternational cases because the other material support charge, § 2339B, applies 
only to foreign organizations. 
 
require the provision of support to acts of terrorism, not designated organizations. Daniels, 
supra note 115. 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). The list of predicate statutes also includes a “catch-all” offense 
that includes violations defined as “federal crimes of terrorism.” Id. (listing § 2332b(g)(5)(B)). 
 133. The connection to terrorist activities does not mean that other aspects of this 
charge’s use are not problematic. Indeed, the manner in which it has been used against some 
Muslim defendants has raised concerns over the preemptive punishment of individuals who 
may not have presented a real threat. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory 
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 484 (2007). 
 134. See id. at 476 (noting use of § 2339A in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 2332b). 
 135. Scott Sullivan, Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism as Terrorism, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 
18, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44274/prosecuting-domestic-terrorism-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/2C79-2Z37]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. The government has used the § 2339A charge against at least four individuals 
accused of providing material support to domestic terrorism. See GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra 
note 103, at 8. 
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5. Sentencing and Confinement 
At the sentencing stage, the uneven coverage of federal terrorism law 
means that a severe federal terrorism sentencing enhancement dispropor-
tionately applies to cases with an international nexus.138 Federal judges must 
consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in all federal criminal cases.139 The 
Guidelines require judges to determine the base offense level for a crime—
generally related to the statute violated—and the extent of a defendant’s past 
criminal history, and then consider enhancements or departures on account 
of other circumstances.140 
Section 3A1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines applies to felonies that “in-
volved, or [were] intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.”141 This 
sentencing enhancement affects three categories of offenses: (1) federal ter-
rorism crimes that are “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of gov-
ernment by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct” and that violate any of more than fifty separate criminal provi-
sions;142 (2) the harboring or concealing of terrorists or obstruction of a fed-
eral terrorism investigation;143 and (3) non-enumerated offenses “calculated 
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coer-
cion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” as well as enumerated of-
fenses intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population” rather than to 
affect government conduct.144 
Where applicable, the enhancement ratchets up sentences in two ways. 
First, it elevates the offense level that judges assign to a crime.145 Second, it 
assigns defendants the most serious criminal history level available, thus 
treating even first-time offenders like individuals with extensive criminal 
 
 138. To be clear, some states also have terrorism sentencing enhancements on the books. 
Lyons, supra note 114. If it turned out that states used these enhancements regularly and with 
substantial effects on sentences, it would make the greater availability of the federal terrorism 
enhancement in international terrorism cases less consequential. 
 139. Since United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), federal judges are no longer re-
quired to sentence defendants within Guidelines ranges. But they must still “consider Guide-
lines ranges” while taking account of “other statutory concerns.” Id. at 245–46; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012) (requiring judges to consider sentencing ranges for “the applicable 
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guide-
lines”). In 2016, nearly 77 percent of sentences complied with Guidelines ranges or did so be-
fore reductions based on prosecutorial actions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT 11 tbl.8 (2016). 
 140. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). 
 141. Id. § 3A1.4. 
 142. Id. § 3A1.4(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
 143. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.2. 
 144. Id. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4 (providing for upward departures not within the terms of 
§ 3A1.4 and capped at the range established by that enhancement). 
 145. Id. § 3A1.4(a). 
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records.146 Together, these provisions result in a minimum sentence of be-
tween 210 and 262 months for offenses to which the enhancement is ap-
plied.147 This enhancement produces its most significant impact on 
individuals who have committed less serious offenses and who have a mini-
mal criminal past. For instance, a first-time offender convicted of malicious-
ly damaging a building with an explosive, without injuring anyone, would 
ordinarily face a fine or minimum sentence of 60 months under the criminal 
statute and a range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment under the Guide-
lines.148 If the court were to apply a terrorism enhancement, however, the 
recommended Guidelines range would spike to 210 to 262 months.149 Nota-
bly, the terrorism enhancement has a much greater effect than a separate 
hate crimes enhancement, which would suggest a sentence of 70 to 87 
months.150 
When an offense qualifies under Section 3A1.4, the enhancement ap-
plies whether it constitutes domestic or international terrorism.151 Indeed, 
courts have applied the enhancement to militia members, white suprema-
cists, abortion clinic bombers, and “Occupy” movement affiliates.152 But the 
 
 146. Id. § 3A1.4(b). 
 147. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 148. I credit my research assistant, Meghan Koushik, for this hypothetical. For a convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2012), the Guidelines would compute a base offense level of 24, 
since the defendant’s offense “created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and 
that risk was created knowingly,” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K1.4(a)(1), and a 
criminal history category of I. The sentencing table prescribes 51 to 63 months of imprison-
ment in such a case. The statute creating the offense specifies a prison term of 5 to 20 years, a 
fine, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). While the statute itself permits up to 240 months’ imprison-
ment, the Guidelines’ range would suggest a far shorter sentence in the absence of an en-
hancement. 
 149. This calculation assumes an offense level of 32 and criminal history category of VI, 
based on Section 3A1.4. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) is listed as a federal crime of terrorism under 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). 
 150. The hate crimes enhancement would upgrade the offense by only three levels and 
leave the criminal history calculation unchanged. This hypothetical assumes a resulting offense 
level of 27 and criminal history category of I. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL  
§ 3A1.1(a). 
 151. Until 1996, the enhancement applied only to crimes that “involved[] or . . . intended 
to promote[] international terrorism.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1995). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) directed the Sentencing Commission to amend the scope of the enhancement to 
cover offenses involving “federal crimes of terrorism.” Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 730, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1303 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 539 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1996). Appellate courts have rejected arguments that the enhancement 
should only apply to terrorism “transcending national boundaries.” United States v. Salim, 549 
F.3d 67, 77–79 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Garey, 546 F.3d 1359, 1361–63 (11th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 988 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 
767, 773 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 407–10 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
application of terrorism enhancement to individuals associated with Occupy Cleveland for at-
tempting to bomb an Ohio bridge); United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005) 
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differential availability of federal terrorism charges means that the enhance-
ment will reach more international cases. Wadie Said observes that, in all re-
ported appellate decisions applying the enhancement to domestic terrorism, 
the cases involved “some form of violent activity or conspiracy to commit 
violence,” in contrast to material support prosecutions for which defendants 
received strikingly long sentences for nonviolent conduct.153 In one notable 
example, a court lengthened the sentence of a man convicted of running a 
cigarette smuggling operation from 57 months to 155 years based on evi-
dence of a single $3,500 payment to Hizballah.154 The combination of mate-
rial support charges unique to foreign organizations and the sentencing 
enhancement thus exposes defendants to “very high sentences for what 
would otherwise be innocuous and constitutionally protected activity.”155 
The greater federal role in international terrorism cases can also affect 
sentences and confinement in other respects. For example, because the fed-
eral government maintains the death penalty while twenty states have abol-
ished it, a federal defendant can be sentenced to death for acts of terrorism in 
a state that has eliminated the death penalty.156 In addition, federal terrorism 
convictions can expose defendants to the use of Special Administrative 
Measures that isolate prisoners, subject them to constant surveillance, and 
sharply restrict contact with family members and legal counsel.157 None of 
this is to suggest that state punishment or prison is lenient—only that the 
federal system regularly deploys terrorism-specific sentencing enhancements 
 
(upholding application of terrorism enhancement to defendant convicted of attempting to 
bomb abortion clinics); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 516–19 (6th Cir. 2001) (up-
holding application of terrorism enhancement to member of domestic militia planning to at-
tack government targets); Sentencing Memorandum at 3–4, United States v. Harpham, No. 
CR-11-00420-JLQ, 2011 WL 6838070 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (applying terrorism enhancement to 
defendant who planted a bomb at a Spokane, Washington, Martin Luther King Jr. Unity 
March). 
 153. SAID, supra note 5, at 125. 
 154. Id. After Booker, Hammoud’s conviction was vacated, and a district court resen-
tenced him to 30 years. Id. at 125–26. 
 155. Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 506 (2014). 
 156. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Coming Federalism Battle in the War over 
the Death Penalty, 70 ARK. L. REV. 309, 328 (2017); Mark Berman, Washington Supreme Court 
Strikes Down State’s Death Penalty, Saying It Is ‘Arbitrary and Racially Biased,’ WASH. POST 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/10/11/
washington-supreme-court-strikes-down-states-death-penalty-saying-it-is-arbitrary-and-
racially-biased/ [https://perma.cc/LU7P-H9PX] (reporting that state of Washington’s invalida-
tion of death penalty brings total to twenty states). Since 1993, the federal government has 
sought the death penalty against sixty-nine defendants for crimes not punishable by death in 
the state where committed, Mannheimer, supra at 312, including Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the co-
perpetrator of the Boston Marathon bombing. Id. at 348. 
 157. For accounts of such restrictions, see Rylee Sommers-Flanagan, The Legal Story of 
Guantánamo North, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1169 (2017). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, su-
pra note 5, at 138–51; ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE DARKEST CORNER: SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND 
EXTREME ISOLATION IN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (2017). 
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and extreme prison regulations that do not apply to those charged with state 
crimes. 
B. The Origins of the Divide 
The preceding sections demonstrate that the terrorism legal divide ac-
crues from a range of legal authorities governing state practices, from sur-
veillance to sentencing. Congress and federal agencies adopted these legal 
authorities in different time periods and for varying purposes. As such, the 
legal divide emerged from the confluence of complex historical factors pre-
dating 9/11, rather than from any single law or motivation. 
In part, the distinct approach to international terrorism stems from 
growing concern over transnational terrorist groups in the decades preced-
ing 9/11.158 Robert Chesney traces the material support laws—a centerpiece 
of the terrorism legal divide—to a larger category of laws proscribing eco-
nomic transactions with foreign adversaries.159 Although the earliest eco-
nomic sanctions laws did not focus on terrorist groups, congressional efforts 
to prohibit financial support for foreign terrorists began in the 1980s.160 Fol-
lowing the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and growing attention 
to U.S. citizens’ financial support to groups opposing the Israel–Palestine 
peace negotiations, Congress passed the two key material support laws.161 
Thus, the distinct approach to international terrorism grew in part out of 
pre-9/11 laws designed to target foreign states and groups in response to for-
eign relations concerns. 
A second historical source is the effort to protect Americans from abu-
sive intelligence practices after revelations in the early 1970s that the CIA, 
NSA, and FBI had surveilled—and covertly disrupted—the civic and political 
activities of thousands of Americans.162 Those revelations led to comprehen-
 
 158. Several accounts identify the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of Israeli athletes as a 
catalyst for growing U.S. public, academic, and governmental concern over international ter-
rorism. See, e.g., TIMOTHY NAFTALI, BLIND SPOT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
COUNTERTERRORISM 54–55 (2005) (describing the Munich incident as defining “the new men-
ace of international terrorism” and triggering the first U.S. government units focused on inter-
national terrorism); LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED 
“TERRORISM” 21–27 (2013) (describing Munich as a turning point in conceptualization of ter-
rorism and identifying significance of the “transnational character of the events”). 
 159. Chesney, supra note 120, at 4. 
 160. Id. at 5–6. 
 161. Id. at 12–18. The passage of the 1996 ban on material support to foreign terrorist 
groups, however, immediately followed the Oklahoma City bombing, which was committed by 
domestic terrorists. Id. 
 162. See David Burnham, The Silent Power of the N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES Mag., Mar. 27, 1983, 
at 60, 63, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/27/magazine/the-silent-power-of-the-nsa.html 
[https://perma.cc/32XS-S7HK] (explaining that the NSA secretly surveilled more than one 
thousand Americans during the late 1960s and early 1970s); Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. 
Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, at 1 https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-
operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html [https://perma.cc/FN82-GKH9] 
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sive hearings by a special Senate committee, chaired by Senator Frank 
Church, into abuses by intelligence and security agencies.163 Concerns over 
domestic intelligence gathering contributed to the passage of FISA, which 
was designed to curb investigations of political speech and dissent while au-
thorizing surveillance of foreign intelligence activities within the United 
States.164 Thus, the distinction between domestic and international terrorism 
grew in part out of 1970s efforts to strike a balance between executive sur-
veillance powers and the civil liberties of Americans. 
Third, the severity of the 9/11 attacks fundamentally shaped the U.S. re-
sponse to—and conception of—international terrorism. In the wake of those 
attacks, the United States launched a global war against al Qaeda–linked ter-
rorists and adopted a “preventative” law enforcement paradigm at home 
aimed at thwarting attacks long before they materialized.165 The fear of fur-
ther attacks, combined with broad, racialized suspicion of Muslims at large, 
led to the planting of informants across U.S. Muslim communities166 and the 
expanded use of material support charges.167 As the threat appeared to shift 
from a centralized al Qaeda organization to a more dispersed threat, gov-
ernment officials applied the tools developed for prototypical “international” 
terrorism to unaffiliated “homegrown” extremists inspired by foreign 
groups.168 
These historical developments all partly explain the differentiation be-
tween domestic and international terrorism. But an account of the legal di-
vide’s origins must consider not only the antecedents of current 
international terrorism laws but also the historic neglect of prevalent forms 
of domestic terrorism. Historian Beverly Gage describes “one of the most 
fascinating and revealing contradictions” in U.S. responses to terrorism: 
“Beginning in the 1880s, bombings attributed to anarchists or labor activists 
often served to justify widespread campaigns of suppression against radical 
movements. Lynchings and race riots, by contrast, generally met with inac-
 
(reporting a massive program of illegal CIA surveillance within the United States); Mark 
Mazzetti, Burglars Who Took On F.B.I. Abandon Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/us/burglars-who-took-on-fbi-abandon-shadows.html 
[https://perma.cc/GPF3-N6VE] (describing 1971 theft of FBI documents that revealed the 
agency’s counterintelligence program). 
 163. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 1–11 (1976) (describing mis-
sion and work of committee). 
 164. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 165. For descriptions of this shift, see, for example, Chesney, supra note 120, at 26–28, 
and Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Mili-
tary Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1099–1108 (2008). 
 166. See Akbar, supra note 5, at 861–65. 
 167. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 120, at 39–46 (describing post-9/11 use of material 
support charges). For more on the racialization of Muslims as terrorists and foreigners, see 
infra Section III.A. 
 168. See infra Section II.C.1 (describing al Qaeda decentralization). 
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tion, even approval, in official circles.”169 Gage observes that the United 
States has not responded to political violence in a uniformly “swift and ac-
tive” fashion, but instead, that “[n]ormative judgments . . . have long shaped 
how and if acts of terrorism become national emergencies.”170 
Historians estimate that between the 1880s and World War II, thou-
sands of people were lynched, three-quarters of whom were African Ameri-
can, to enforce a “racial caste system of white supremacy.”171 Similar political 
objectives underlay campaigns of violence against other racial minority 
groups.172 Local law enforcement officials often tolerated and even facilitated 
white racial violence.173 From the 1880s through the civil rights era, the fed-
eral government largely failed to enforce criminal civil rights laws, and Con-
gress rejected multiple attempts to pass federal anti-lynching legislation.174 
Though the terrorism legal divide requires further historical excava-
tion,175 the divide likely originates in multiple roots: the extension to foreign 
terrorist groups of sanctions laws first designed to target foreign states, the 
concern over domestic intelligence gathering in the wake of midcentury 
abuses, the singular post-9/11 attention to international terrorism, and his-
torical state tolerance of reactionary and white supremacist violence. 
C. The Effects of the Divide 
The terrorism legal divide has significant effects along racial and reli-
gious lines. Section I.A illustrated the disparate consequences for individuals 
 
 169. Beverly Gage, Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field, 98 J. AM. 
HIST. 73, 88 (2011). 
 170. Id. 
 171. MANFRED BERG, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN AMERICA 92–93 
(2011); see also PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF 
BLACK AMERICA xi (2002) (observing that historians have come to view lynching as a “system-
atized reign of terror that was used to maintain the power whites had over blacks,” rather than 
as a “frenzied abnormality”); AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING 
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1890–1940, at 1–4 (2009) (describing the transformation of 
lynchings after Reconstruction into a form of “racial terror” imparting messages about white 
domination). 
 172. See, e.g., BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 1–5 (2018) (arguing that purges of Chinese communi-
ties were intended to achieve local, national, and international exclusion); JEAN PFAELZER, 
DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR AGAINST CHINESE AMERICANS xxv (2007) (describing 
nearly 200 expulsions of Chinese people from Western towns between 1850 and 1906). 
 173. See BERG, supra note 171, at 153–57; FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: 
BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 131 (1999). 
 174. LAWRENCE, supra note 173, at 123–32; see also MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 98–126 (2014) (describing the 
defeat of anti-lynching legislation in Congress in 1922–1923 despite a concerted NAACP cam-
paign). 
 175. According to Gage, scholars have written separate histories of terrorist campaigns in 
the United States without stitching together a “coherent historiography of terrorism,” and have 
particularly neglected state and societal responses to terrorism. Gage, supra note 169, at 81. 
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and communities: those labeled international terrorists are subject to elec-
tronic FISA surveillance, Section 215 orders, NSLs, less accountable inform-
ant investigations, material support charges, the greater likelihood of federal 
prosecution, and the punitive consequences of federalization. But these di-
rect effects do not capture the full harm of the legal divide in producing and 
rationalizing a racialized understanding of terrorism. 
The domestic–international legal binary affects how government offi-
cials understand and characterize political violence and promotes the spuri-
ous notion that Muslims and immigrants are primarily responsible for 
terrorism in the United States. For example, government officials say they 
hesitate to describe domestic cases as terrorism where explicit federal terror-
ism charges are not available. Former FBI Director James Comey claimed as 
much when he refused to label the Charleston church attack an act of terror-
ism.176 The Justice Department National Security Division (NSD)’s top offi-
cial charged with addressing domestic terrorism asserted that federal 
prosecutors refrain from describing domestic cases as terrorism because 
judges might find such statements prejudicial, but use the label in interna-
tional cases because they often include explicit terrorism charges.177 This 
asymmetric use of the terrorism label reinforces the popular equation of ter-
rorism with Muslims and foreigners.178 
The federal government’s bifurcated approach also distorts public un-
derstanding of the terrorist threat in the aggregate. The NSD periodically is-
sues a chart of unsealed “international terrorism and terrorism-related 
convictions” listing hundreds of defendants.179 It does not release statistics 
on domestic terrorism convictions nor explain how it determines that cases 
are international.180 The list includes hundreds of Muslims, including indi-
 
 176. Reilly, supra note 1. 
 177. Reilly, supra note 15. This is not to say that the lack of formal terrorism charges in a 
given case ought to prevent federal officials from using the terrorism label where the evidence 
supports it. Moreover, while government officials cite a concern for not stigmatizing defend-
ants in domestic cases, they do not display the same concern in all contexts. See Shirin Sinnar, 
More Misleading Claims on Immigrants and Terrorism, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/38341/misleading-claims-immigrants-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/K2J6-HGES] (observing that the government continues to list 100 people 
arrested in a post-9/11 immigrant sweep on a list of “terrorism-related convictions” despite 
evidence that the department arbitrarily designated immigrants as terrorism suspects after 
9/11). 
 178. This is especially so because media depend heavily on law enforcement information 
in the initial reporting of crime stories, allowing law enforcement to “control the narrative” 
after major crimes. AARONSON, supra note 5, at 71. 
 179. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L SEC. DIV., INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY DIVISION’S CHART OF PUBLIC/UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 
TERRORISM-RELATED CONVICTIONS FROM 9/11/01 TO 12/31/15, at 1 (2016). 
 180. In January 2017, the Justice Department released the National Security Division 
(NSD) list in response to a FOIA request I submitted, but did not respond to my request for 
statistics related to domestic terrorism or “[a]ny description of the NSD’s methodology for 
compiling the above records, including an explanation of how investigations are classified as 
relating to either ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ terrorism.” Letter from Kevin Tiernan, Chief, 
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viduals connected to foreign groups only through the fictional representa-
tions of government informants.181 The list’s exclusive focus on “interna-
tional” cases results in the statistical erasure of domestic terrorism and the 
corresponding inflation of threats from Muslims, immigrants, and foreign-
ers. 
Political leaders then use the slanted statistics to justify policies directed 
at Muslims and immigrants, such as President Trump’s travel ban targeting 
several majority Muslim countries. Shortly before issuing the second version 
of the travel ban, President Trump told Congress that the “vast majority of 
individuals” convicted of terrorism-related offenses came from outside the 
United States.182 One year later, the President tweeted that “nearly 3 in 4 in-
dividuals convicted of terrorism-related charges are foreign-born,”183 citing a 
new government report that again counted only international terrorism cas-
es.184 Independent researchers who examined the NSD data concluded that if 
the data had incorporated domestic terrorism convictions, the proportion of 
foreign-born defendants would have plummeted to 18–21 percent.185 
While the travel ban represents the most dramatic example, the use of 
skewed terrorism data to justify state discrimination did not begin with 
Trump. For instance, in 2011–2012, Representative Peter King convened a 
series of pointed congressional hearings on “[r]adicalization in the American 
 
Records Management and FOIA Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Nat’l Sec. Div., to author (Jan. 29, 
2017) (on file with author). The NSD’s introduction to the chart states only that cases are in-
cluded where the investigation “involved an identified link to international terrorism” and 
where career prosecutors decide to include them on a “case-by-case basis.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE NAT’L SEC. DIV., supra note 179, at 1–2. 
 181. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 200–04 (2d Cir. 2013); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE NAT’L SEC. DIV., supra note 179, at 7. 
 182. Trump’s Speech to Congress: Video and Transcript, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/trump-congress-video-transcript.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HBG-PCLR]. The Justice Department supported this claim the following 
day with a more specific reference to the NSD list. See Matt Shuham, What Are ‘Terrorism-
Related’ Offenses Trump Claims Foreigners Commit?, TPM (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:23 PM), 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/what-are-trump-terrorism-related-offenses 
[https://perma.cc/9TTZ-P3EK]; see also Sinnar, supra note 177. 
 183. See Lisa Daniels et al., Trump Repeats His Lies About Terrorism, Immigration and 
Justice Department Data, LAWFARE, (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
trump-repeats-his-lies-about-terrorism-immigration-and-justice-department-data [https://
perma.cc/M5QD-DAWB] (citing presidential tweet). 
 184. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE ORDER 13780: 
PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES INITIAL 
SECTION 11 REPORT, at 2 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Executive%20Order%2013780%20Section%2011%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24G7-JN35]. 
 185. Nora Ellingsen & Lisa Daniels, What the Data Really Show About Terrorists Who 
‘Came Here,’ Part III: What If You Included Domestic Terrorism Cases?, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 
2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-data-really-show-about-terrorists-who-
came-here-part-iii-what-if-you-included-domestic [https://perma.cc/6M2L-7E2F] (using ter-
rorism conviction data from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse). 
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Muslim [c]ommunity.”186 He defended his decision to single out Muslims on 
the grounds that a Justice Department report showed no evidence of neo-
Nazi, environmental, or other domestic terrorism incidents—even though 
independent researchers documented over two dozen such acts in the same 
time period.187 
Skewed representations of the terrorist threat also drive up the overall 
punitiveness of counterterrorism policy. Social science research suggests that 
the perception that terrorism is committed mostly by Middle Eastern indi-
viduals fuels support for harsher state responses.188 In addition, governmen-
tal targeting has cascading effects on Muslim communities and other racial 
and ethnic groups thought to be associated with them, including the licens-
ing of private discrimination and hate violence.189 Equally important, the 
overwhelming attention to Muslims diminishes law enforcement attention 
to other serious threats that fall outside popular conceptions of terrorists.190 
The terrorism legal divide thus creates pernicious feedback loops, as dif-
ferential legal treatment fuels social constructions of terrorists as Muslim 
and foreign that in turn reinforce punitive and discriminatory state policies. 
As elsewhere, legal categories not only impose immediate consequences on 
individuals but also contribute to longer-term processes of racialization.191 
 
 186. David A. Fahrenthold & Michelle Boorstein, Rep. Peter King’s Muslim Hearings: A 
Key Moment in an Angry Conversation, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:56 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030902061.html 
[https://perma.cc/R68L-JK7N]; see also Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective 
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 483–87 (2011) (likening Rep. 
King’s hearings to McCarthy-era hearings on “un-American activities”). 
 187. See Neiwert, supra note 12 (contrasting Rep. King’s 2011 statement with the Investi-
gative Fund’s data revealing twenty-seven domestic extremist incidents in the same two-year 
period). 
 188. See Kelly Welch, Middle Eastern Terrorist Stereotypes and Anti-Terror Policy Sup-
port: The Effect of Perceived Minority Threat, 6 RACE & JUST. 117, 133 (2016) (using multivari-
ate analysis of national survey data to conclude that those who stereotype terrorists as Middle 
Eastern are more likely to support punitive anti-terror policies, controlling for political ideolo-
gy, race, and prejudice). 
 189. On the connection between state discrimination and private violence, see, for exam-
ple, Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of 
Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2004) (describing the “mutually reinforcing relationship 
between individual hate crimes [or prejudice] and governmental racial profiling”). 
 190. See Neiwert, supra note 12; Janet Reitman, U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the 
Threat of White Nationalism. Now They Don’t Know How to Stop It, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-
far-right.html [perma.cc/WUL8-MRYQ]. 
 191. Critical race theorists, sociologists, and others have explored at length the processes 
of racialization—the social construction of racial groups and the assignment of relative privi-
lege across them—and the relationships between law and racialization. Classics in this vast lit-
erature include IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th 
anniversary ed. 2006) (arguing that law constructs race both by imposing rules and by trans-
mitting ideas); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (tracing the historical emer-
gence of ideas of black criminality, including through pseudoscientific statistical representa-
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II. THE UNPERSUASIVE RATIONALES FOR THE LEGAL DIVIDE 
Part I showed that the gap between domestic and international terrorism 
law has serious effects on individuals, communities, and the nation. The le-
gal divide operates to subject one group of people—mostly Muslim and 
nonwhite—to a harsher and less accountable legal regime than other groups. 
Part II shows how none of the three leading rationales for the legal divide—
civil liberties, federalism, and the magnitude of threats—provides a persua-
sive justification. 
A. Civil Liberties Rationales 
Perhaps the single most common rationale advanced for the legal divide 
is that it protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. This rationale 
goes beyond citizenship and territoriality distinctions in differentiating be-
tween those accused of supporting domestic and international terrorism—
even if all are U.S. citizens or residents within the United States. Thus, Susan 
Hennessey has asserted that not all “politically-motivated violence” is treated 
the same way because “the civil liberties consequences of doing so could be 
profound.”192 She contends that the domestic use of intelligence tools de-
signed to address overseas threats “risks infringing into areas of constitu-
tionally protected speech, religion, and association” and “risks toppling a 
carefully calculated balance.”193 Andrew McCarthy has argued that the con-
stitutional rights and privacy of Americans justify more protections for do-
mestic terrorism than for terrorism “driven by foreign forces.”194 
The civil liberties rationale appears most often in two contexts: the crim-
inalization of material support for terrorist organizations, which implicates 
First Amendment rights, and the scope of permissible surveillance within the 
United States, which implicates the Fourth Amendment.195 Civil liberties ar-
guments address both the individual and government-interest sides of the 
constitutional balance. One claim is that domestic terrorism laws threaten 
 
tions); and MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1986) (setting out a theory of racial formation and foregrounding the role of state policy in 
racial formation); see also Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets 
Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2014) (listing core CRT claims and exploring 
benefits of collaboration with social science methods). Part III further discusses racialization as 
an explanation for the persistence of the legal terrorism divide. 
 192. Hennessey, supra note 21. Her civil liberties claim also merges with a federalism 
claim, which Part III will consider separately. See id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Andrew C. McCarthy, Let Virginia Prosecute the Charlottesville Terrorism, NAT’L 
REV. (Aug. 14, 2017, 9:50 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/charlottesville-
terrorist-attack-virginia-should-prosecute-not-feds/ [https://perma.cc/QY35-5RJU]. 
 195. This is not to say that terrorism investigations and prosecutions do not implicate 
other constitutional rights, like due process or Sixth Amendment rights, only that the civil lib-
erties argument has been offered as an explanation for the divide primarily in the First and 
Fourth Amendment contexts. 
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individual rights to a greater degree. A second claim is that the government 
has more compelling interests in countering terrorism with an international 
nexus. But these arguments do not convincingly justify the terrorism legal 
divide. 
1. The First Amendment and Material Support 
Recent debate on the asymmetric treatment of domestic terrorism has 
often focused on 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the criminal provision banning material 
support to designated foreign organizations. While some have called for the 
designation of various right-wing or left-wing groups, others have argued 
that extending the material support ban to domestic organizations would 
raise civil liberties concerns that are tolerable only with respect to foreign or-
ganizations. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
(HLP) provides a natural starting point for this claim.196 In HLP, U.S. citi-
zens and nonprofit organizations sought to support the lawful political activ-
ities of two designated foreign terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by 
advocating on their behalf and training them to petition international bodies 
and use international law.197 Although the Court held that the plaintiffs’ 
proposed activities constituted speech, it deferred heavily to congressional 
and executive findings that all support to foreign terrorist organizations 
promotes their violence.198 The decision opined that contributions to peace-
ful activities could enable organizations to divert other resources to violent 
activities, legitimize the organizations, strain U.S. relations with allies, and 
undercut international efforts to address terrorism.199 While rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the Court suggested two limits to its 
decision. It drew a distinction between speech coordinated with foreign ter-
rorist organizations, which could be prohibited, and independent speech 
benefiting them.200 And it suggested that a similar ban on material support 
for domestic organizations might fail constitutional scrutiny.201 
Although the Court did not explain what would distinguish a material 
support ban on domestic organizations, others have attempted to do so. Two 
proposed rationales relate to the relative cost of speech suppression in the 
case of domestic and foreign terrorist groups; two other rationales relate to 
the strength of government interests. None of these rationales, however, is 
persuasive. 
 
 196. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 197. HLP, 561 U.S. at 9–10, 21–23. 
 198. Id. at 27–29, 33–35. 
 199. Id. at 30–33. 
 200. Id. at 39. 
 201. Id. 
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First, some have argued that speech and association with domestic or-
ganizations are more central to the First Amendment’s purpose of protecting 
democratic self-government.202 David Cole argues, for instance, that while 
self-government is “virtually impossible” if the state can prohibit speech co-
ordinated with domestic political groups, “restrictions on speech with for-
eign organizations arguably pose a less direct challenge to the mechanisms of 
democracy.”203 
While it stands to reason that a ban on speech or association with all 
domestic political groups would exact a more crippling effect on democracy, 
the question here is not the relative impact of suppressing speech coordinat-
ed with domestic or foreign organizations writ large. On the narrower ques-
tion of suppressing speech coordinated with organizations found to engage 
in terrorism, the democratic impact of speech suppression does not turn on 
an organization’s domestic or foreign status. At least where U.S. citizens or 
residents are doing the speaking, the value and volume of that speech is not 
necessarily greater for speech coordinated with domestic groups.204 
Aziz Huq has argued that the existing material support ban distorts the 
“national political market” by excluding certain speech from the public 
sphere.205 Foreign affairs “occupy a meaningful tranche of the national polit-
ical debate initiated by domestic actors,” and such actors often have signifi-
cant interests in U.S. foreign policy on Ireland, the Middle East, and other 
regions.206 Even with the distinction the Court attempted to create between 
coordinated and independent speech, the existing ban might reach a fair 
amount of speech, potentially including the filing of an amicus brief, a news-
paper’s publication of an op-ed, or a filmmaker’s documentary produced in 
coordination with such a designated foreign organization.207 
 
 202. See, e.g., David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Hu-
manitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 173 
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 203. Id. at 173. 
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 205. Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. 
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Second, some have argued that designating domestic organizations pos-
es a greater First Amendment threat because administrations will be tempted 
to target their political opponents. Cole argues that the risk is greater because 
“domestic organizations are potentially in a position to challenge the incum-
bent administration’s hold on political power, while foreign organizations 
generally are not.”208 
Although the concern over designating domestic political adversaries is 
legitimate—especially in a polarized political environment—the foreign des-
ignations equally tempt leaders to target U.S. communities for disfavored 
ideas or because of racial or ethnic status. The historical record demonstrates 
the opportunistic targeting of groups with perceived foreign connections, 
whether Eastern and Southern European immigrants during the Red Scares 
or Japanese Americans during World War II.209 Government officials target 
such groups not because they threaten their power, but because their relative 
lack of power enables officials to pander to prejudice with limited backlash. 
The discretionary nature of the designation process, and the difficulty of 
mounting a selective prosecution challenge, facilitates politically motivated 
designations.210 
For instance, the Trump Administration considered designating the 
Muslim Brotherhood, a broad-based Islamist movement with millions of fol-
lowers, as a foreign terrorist organization, arguably to undermine U.S. Mus-
lim civic institutions.211 If it made such a move, the domestic political 
reaction would likely be muted given the marginal political power of the af-
fected community. By contrast, the mere disclosure of a Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence report on “rightwing extremism” in 
2009—far less consequential than a designation—led to political backlash so 
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severe that the Obama Administration gutted an intelligence unit focused on 
domestic extremism, canceled briefings on militia groups, and held up near-
ly a dozen other reports on domestic extremism.212 In sum, the risk of ad-
ministrations branding domestic organizations as terrorists for ill-motivated 
reasons does not necessarily exceed the parallel threat with respect to foreign 
designations.213 
Third, one might argue that domestic terrorist organizations present less 
risk of disrupting U.S. foreign relations. The HLP decision cited diplomatic 
concerns as a justification for banning material support to foreign terrorist 
organizations, noting, for instance, that Turkey might vigorously protest 
U.S. individuals’ support for the PKK.214 
But it is not clear what weight to give such foreign relations considera-
tions in distinguishing between domestic and international terrorism. While 
designated foreign groups threaten foreign interests, they may pose a lesser 
threat to the United States than domestic groups. While current law requires 
the Secretary of State to conclude that an organization threatens U.S. nation-
al security or U.S. nationals in order to list it, it does not require that the 
threat be substantial or direct.215 The list of foreign terrorist organizations 
includes groups engaged in various local conflicts in foreign countries with 
an unclear relationship to U.S. foreign relations or economic interests.216 In 
contrast, domestic terrorist organizations, by definition, threaten Americans. 
Hence, the foreign relations concern does not necessarily give the govern-
ment a greater interest in curtailing speech related to international terrorism. 
A fourth—and more plausible—rationale for according greater protec-
tion to domestic terrorist organizations is that the government can more eas-
ily control such groups and therefore does not need blunt bans on speech or 
association.217 Outside U.S. jurisdiction, the government cannot regulate fi-
nancial activity, freeze assets, undertake investigations, take custody of indi-
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viduals, or prevent the acquisition of resources as easily or completely as it 
can within U.S. borders.218 
Yet for several reasons, this claim understates U.S. power to counter ter-
rorist funding or activity outside its borders. First, the United States exercis-
es substantial coercive influence over other states and international legal 
bodies. At U.S. behest, within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security 
Council required all states to adopt extraordinary measures to suppress ter-
rorist financing, criminalize terrorism, and submit to U.N. monitoring—an 
unprecedented Security Council demand on states to change their domestic 
laws.219 When the United States decides a country has insufficiently thwarted 
terrorism, it can pressure international organizations to apply devastating 
sanctions.220 Second, U.S. prosecutors and courts have expansively interpret-
ed U.S. law to cover extraterritorial conduct. U.S. anti–terrorism financing 
laws increasingly reach the extraterritorial activities of non-U.S. financial in-
stitutions.221 The U.S. government has increasingly brought foreigners to 
stand trial in the United States for crimes committed abroad, even where the 
defendants neither targeted, nor had previously set foot in, the United 
States.222 Third, U.S. power is less constrained abroad because of fewer rights 
accorded to noncitizens outside the United States. From military strikes to 
dragnet surveillance, the United States does abroad what it could never do at 
home. So long as such latitude exists, U.S. criminal law should recognize that 
the government’s capacity abroad in some respects exceeds that within the 
 
 218. See Martin, supra note 217. 
 219. Paul C. Szasz, Notes and Comments, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 901, 902–03 (2002); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-
Constitutional Ideas: The Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of 
Emergency, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 347, 352–54 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 
2006) (discussing post-9/11 measures adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 2001). 
 220. See, e.g., Salman Masood, At U.S. Urging, Pakistan to Be Placed on Terrorism-
Financing List, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/
world/asia/pakistan-terror-finance-list.html [https://perma.cc/VE9F-QL7Y]. 
 221. Alex Lakatos & Jan Blöchliger, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Fi-
nance Laws, 2009 GESKR 344, 346, https://www.geskr.ch/journal/previous-issues/geskr-03-
2009.html [https://perma.cc/R5W5-3WB6]. 
 222. Stephanie Clifford, Growing Body of Law Allows Prosecution of Foreign Citizens on 
U.S. Soil, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/growing-
body-of-law-allows-prosecution-of-foreign-citizens-on-us-soil.html [https://perma.cc/N57A-
AYZ9]; see e.g., United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 CR. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 5041456, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge to prosecution of Eritrean national 
and Swedish resident for providing material support to al-Shabaab on the grounds that he was 
brought to the United States for prosecution and that al-Shabaab was a designated foreign ter-
rorist organization); see also Nora Ellingsen & Lisa Daniels, What the Data Really Show About 
Terrorists Who “Came Here,” Part I: Introduction and Overview, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 2017, 
10:29 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-data-really-show-about-terrorists-who-came-
here-part-i-introduction-and-overview [https://perma.cc/A6WG-6XAP] (noting 100 terrorism 
convictions of individuals brought to the United States for prosecution). 
May 2019] Separate and Unequal 1373 
United States.223 Thus, claims of heightened government interests with re-
spect to international terrorism must account for the reality of U.S. global 
power, not an artificial view of sovereignty ending at the water’s edge. 
None of this is to deny that the tools for suppressing transnational ter-
rorist financing or activity may differ from those available with respect to 
domestic groups. But the powerful tools available to the United States abroad 
make the civil liberties rationale an unpersuasive basis for categorical dis-
tinctions between domestic and international terrorism. 
2. The Fourth Amendment and the Scope of Surveillance 
In contrast to the relatively recent material support ban, the surveillance 
regime has distinguished between domestic and international terrorism for 
forty years. Largely directed at intelligence collection on foreign states and 
counterespionage, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act also estab-
lished standards to surveil international terrorism within the United States 
that would not apply to domestic terrorism.224 This Section argues that: (1) 
the reasons for distinguishing between the surveillance of U.S. individuals 
connected to domestic and international terrorism are overdrawn; and (2) 
even if the distinction were plausible, the government may be stretching 
FISA to reach individuals with a scant connection to international terrorist 
organizations. 
In United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), the Supreme Court first 
suggested that Fourth Amendment rights might apply differently to surveil-
lance connected to domestic and foreign organizations.225 The case arose out 
of the bombing of a CIA office in Michigan.226 The Attorney General had 
wiretapped the defendants “to protect the nation from attempts of domestic 
organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the govern-
ment.”227 No evidence linked the threat to a foreign power, “directly or indi-
rectly.”228 The Court had earlier required a warrant for wiretapping related 
to conventional crime,229 and Congress had accordingly legislated wiretap-
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ping rules in Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act.230 The question remained whether the Fourth Amendment also re-
quired judicial authorization for electronic surveillance in a national security 
case.231 Keith held that it did in cases involving the “domestic aspects of na-
tional security,” but disclaimed an opinion on surveillance involving foreign 
powers or their agents.232 
In the years following Keith, lower courts split on whether foreign intel-
ligence surveillance also required a court warrant.233 Congress responded to 
the legal uncertainty by enacting FISA. The law created a specialized foreign 
intelligence court to approve surveillance warrants on a less demanding 
standard, but left domestic organizations—including those suspected of ter-
rorism or other security threats—subject to Title III.234 
At the time of FISA’s passage, courts and Congress typically recognized 
that even the surveillance of foreign threats could implicate Americans’ pri-
vacy and civil liberties. The Senate Church Committee, established to inves-
tigate surveillance abuses, had concluded that elastic claims of foreign 
influence had led to improper surveillance of U.S. activists like Dr. Martin 
Luther King.235 Therefore, defenders of reduced Fourth Amendment protec-
tion for foreign threats generally pointed to the government-interest side of 
the equation. They advanced either the formal claim that the president en-
joyed greater constitutional authority over foreign affairs or various func-
tional claims related to investigative needs or relative institutional expertise 
in foreign intelligence cases.236 
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But a major historical argument for distinguishing between investiga-
tions of domestic and international terrorism no longer applies. For two 
decades, FISA’s distinct legal regime could be justified on the grounds that 
foreign intelligence surveillance was less likely to be used to prosecute people 
than for other foreign relations purposes. Several courts interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to allow issuance of FISA warrants only where the 
“primary purpose” of the surveillance was to collect foreign intelligence, ra-
ther than to gather evidence for criminal prosecution.237 But after September 
11, 2001, Congress and the FISA Court of Review permitted the use of FISA 
so long as a “significant purpose” of the surveillance was to gather foreign 
intelligence.238 As a result of this lower bar, law enforcement officials can 
now use FISA even when they seek that evidence primarily to prosecute in-
dividuals for terrorism. Thus, the purpose behind surveillance no longer 
separates international terrorism investigations under FISA from standard 
criminal investigations of domestic terrorism: in each case, law enforcement 
officials may undertake the investigation for the primary purpose of prose-
cuting a suspect. 
There are three remaining rationales for differentiating between the sur-
veillance of domestic and international terrorism, though none is ultimately 
persuasive. First, some argue that the nature of international terrorism inves-
tigations calls for greater flexibility with respect to secrecy, duration, and 
oversight.239 For instance, the FISA Court of Review acknowledged that, un-
like in Title III cases, the government typically left FISA surveillance devices 
on continuously and only minimized the impact on privacy in the “indexing 
and logging” of those communications.240 But the court suggested that this 
reduced protection might be justified because the communications might 
use “guarded or coded language,” reflect a widespread conspiracy, take place 
in a foreign language, or involve “multiple actors and complex plots.”241 
Yet these same investigative challenges also apply in domestic terrorism 
cases. Indeed, Keith observed that domestic security investigations often re-
quire long-term intelligence collection, seek interrelated information, pre-
sent special difficulties in the identification of targets, and aim to prevent 
unlawful activity or prepare for future emergencies.242 The complexity and 
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sensitivity of an investigation would seem to vary based on the scope or or-
ganized nature of the particular threat, rather than whether it emanated from 
a domestic or foreign source. As to language capacity, it cannot be assumed 
that U.S. citizens or residents attracted to foreign terrorist groups speak a 
language other than English. 
Second, some argue that courts have less expertise in foreign relations 
than in domestic affairs and should have a lesser role in approving surveil-
lance related to international terrorism.243 Yet legal scholars have cogently 
challenged claims that judges lack institutional competence to evaluate for-
eign relations or security claims, or that the executive branch enjoys unparal-
leled expertise on such issues.244 While inexpert on foreign groups, the 
average judge also has little expertise in the organizational structure of a 
right-wing militia, the threat it poses, or the government’s need for particu-
lar information. A judge draws on law enforcement affidavits, not prior ex-
perience, to assess the facts in a warrant application. Moreover, if Justice 
Department lawyers can write warrant applications, it is not clear why feder-
al judges cannot evaluate whether a legal standard is met based on the factual 
information and context provided. 
Third, some claim that foreign relations concerns necessitate a more ag-
gressive response to international terrorism, because a failure to suppress 
terrorism implicates U.S. relationships with other nations and international 
obligations.245 This argument reprises the claim of heightened diplomatic 
interests made with respect to the material support ban on foreign terrorist 
organizations.246 But again, such foreign relations concerns do not necessari-
ly elevate government interests beyond those applicable in domestic terror-
ism cases. In a polarized environment, violence by right-wing or left-wing 
political groups may threaten society as much as, or more than, the displeas-
ure of foreign states.247 
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Finally, even if these rationales for distinguishing between domestic and 
international terrorism were plausible, the law appears to permit FISA sur-
veillance in contexts far removed from these stated justifications. For in-
stance, as discussed earlier, FISA’s lone wolf provision allows surveillance 
within the United States of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terror-
ism who are unconnected to any organization. Furthermore, even with re-
spect to U.S. citizens and permanent residents, FISA definitions of 
international terrorism and “agents of a foreign power” seem to permit sur-
veillance of those with limited actual contact with foreign organizations—
perhaps even of U.S. individuals who join one other person in domestic acts 
aimed at influencing a global audience.248 If the court and government inter-
pret FISA in that fashion, then the rationales for a permissive approach to 
international terrorism break down altogether. Investigations of U.S. indi-
viduals with limited international relationships do not present the kind of 
complexity or foreign relations concerns that courts have offered in defense 
of FISA.249 Moreover, in many cases, little besides ideology distinguishes 
Americans in the heartland attracted to ISIS from others reveling in violent 
white nationalist rhetoric online.250 Thus, the rationales for FISA’s distinc-
tive legal regime do not extend to the surveillance of individuals with scant 
international ties. 
*     *     * 
The civil liberties rationales for differentiating between domestic and in-
ternational terrorism are overbroad: the investigation and prosecution of 
both forms of terrorism can impinge on Americans’ privacy and civil liber-
ties, and the strength of government interests does not correspond to the 
domestic or international character of the threat. Moreover, a conception of 
international terrorism that encompasses Islamic extremism wherever it is 
based would subvert those rationales altogether. 
 
rejecting the killing”); Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Opinion, White Nationalism Is Destroying the 
West, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/opinion/sunday/
white-nationalism-threat-islam-america.html [https://perma.cc/72M4-XSWJ] (arguing that 
“white nationalism poses a significantly greater threat to Western democracies” than Islamism 
because its “proponents and sympathizers” have won power or substantial vote shares in mul-
tiple countries). Part II.C considers whether the scale of international terrorism justifies differ-
ent approaches to domestic and international terrorism. 
 248. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 249. In fact, these are the same reasons that some argue that FISA’s lone wolf provision 
violates the Fourth Amendment. See Patricia L. Bellia, The “Lone Wolf” Amendment and the 
Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 457–58 (2005) (reviewing 
arguments). 
 250. A National Institute of Justice–funded study of modern U.S. lone wolf terrorists 
stresses the importance of online communities in providing personal, ideological, and practical 
support both to “Net Nazis” and “Cyber Jihadists.” MARK S. HAMM & RAMÓN SPAAIJ, THE AGE 
OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM 157–58, 168 (2017). 
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B. Federalism Rationales 
A second leading rationale for distinguishing between terrorism with 
and without an international nexus is that federalism supports such a dis-
tinction, especially with respect to the charging and prosecution of offenses. 
Although no full-throated defense of this idea appears in legal scholarship, 
the idea commonly surfaces in public legal commentary. For instance, Susan 
Hennessey has argued that a federal domestic terrorism statute would in-
trude on state authority and that states can adequately prosecute politically 
motivated murders within their borders.251 By contrast, she argues that 
“larger foreign policy and military concerns that are exclusively the province 
of federal government” and a lack of state capacity justify federal prosecution 
of cases with a “substantial foreign connection.”252 In a similar vein, former 
terrorism prosecutor Andrew McCarthy has argued that state and local po-
lice are well equipped to investigate domestic threats and that an expanded 
federal role would “deplete the sparse but essential resources necessary to 
combat international terrorism.”253 
This Part contends that neither the current doctrine nor the underlying 
principles behind federalism justify the uneven federalization of domestic 
and international terrorism. First, constitutional doctrine would permit 
greater federal prosecution of domestic terrorism than current statutes pro-
vide. Second, the advantages and disadvantages of federal prosecution do not 
map onto the domestic–international divide. While there are good reasons 
not to expand federal jurisdiction over domestic terrorism, those reasons al-
so raise concern over the current jurisdictional approach to international 
terrorism. 
1. Federalism Doctrine 
Constitutional doctrine suggests four points. First, the federal govern-
ment can prosecute international terrorism based on its constitutionally 
enumerated powers to regulate commerce between states and with foreign 
nations, to define and punish “Offences against the Law of Nations,” to de-
clare war, and to make treaties.254 Second, states can prosecute domestic ter-
 
 251. Hennessey, supra note 21; see also Byman, supra note 3 (“To qualify as federal, the 
issue must be a national one, requiring cross-state authority and federal resources.”). 
 252. Hennessey, supra note 21. To be clear, Hennessey does not argue that federal prose-
cution should only be available where there is an international nexus. She describes, with ap-
parent approval, the current approach of federal terrorism law that distinguishes “based on the 
manner in which the crime is perpetrated” for cases without a strong extraterritorial compo-
nent. Id. Further, she acknowledges that current federal law does not encompass mass shoot-
ings without a foreign nexus, potentially leading to “disparate treatment based on ideology.” 
Id. 
 253. McCarthy, supra note 208. 
 254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8, 10, 11; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (citing feder-
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rorism occurring within their borders based on their traditional police pow-
ers to suppress violent crime.255 
Third, states can exercise criminal jurisdiction over international terror-
ism committed or threatened within their borders where state law does not 
conflict with federal law. The Supreme Court has found state laws affecting 
foreign relations preempted where they conflict with a federal statute or ex-
ecutive agreement.256 Under these decisions, state terrorism laws that direct-
ly contradict federal statutes or policies or that present an obstacle to the 
realization of Congress’s objectives might be preempted.257 For instance, the 
Supremacy Clause might invalidate state statutes that criminalize material 
support to a different set of foreign terrorist organizations than those desig-
nated by the Secretary of State under federal law. By contrast, state laws al-
lowing for the prosecution of threats or acts of violence within state borders 
should not be preempted, even if applied to individuals with international 
links.258 
Fourth, some constitutional limits exist on the federal government’s au-
thority to prosecute purely domestic terrorism, but under the Commerce 
Clause,259 Congress would likely be able to criminalize a much greater swath 
of domestic terrorism than it has chosen to do. The Court partly scaled back 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction in United States v. Lopez260 and United States 
v. Morrison.261 In Lopez, the Court struck down a federal prohibition on fire-
arm possession in a school zone, holding that gun possession near schools 
was not an economic activity that substantially affected interstate com-
merce.262 Likewise, in Morrison, it rejected a federal civil remedy for gender-
motivated violent crimes because such crimes did not qualify as economic 
activity and had too attenuated an effect on interstate commerce.263 This 
precedent might not permit federal criminalization of all domestic terrorism, 
 
al authority to punish crimes against the law of nations, to carry out treaties, and to address the 
effect of international terrorism on foreign and interstate commerce). 
 255. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (describing the power to 
suppress violent crime as “denied [to] the National Government and reposed in the States”). 
 256. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (invalidating California statute on 
disclosure of Holocaust victims’ insurance claims where Court found a “clear conflict” with 
executive agreements); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidat-
ing Massachusetts statute imposing sanctions on companies doing business with Burma be-
cause it conflicted with congressional sanctions statute). 
 257. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373, 377 (describing and finding obstacle preemption). 
 258. Courts have upheld state laws that heighten the impact of federal terrorism designa-
tions. See Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (sustaining 
Florida law prohibiting funding of state university employees’ travel to countries designated by 
the federal government as state sponsors of terrorism). 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States”). 
 260. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 261. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 262. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 263. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 616–17. 
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if courts view terrorism as a noneconomic activity with too remote an im-
pact on interstate commerce.264 
Nonetheless, Congress could likely criminalize a lot of domestic terror-
ism through creating specific offenses more closely tied to interstate com-
merce. Lopez and Morrison leave unchanged the regulation of the “channels” 
and “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce—two traditional categories 
of Commerce Clause regulation.265 Lopez also suggests that federal statutes 
will survive scrutiny where they require prosecutors to establish a connec-
tion to interstate commerce in individual cases.266 
Thus, under the power to regulate the “channels” of interstate com-
merce, Congress could criminalize the interstate transportation of people or 
resources to facilitate terrorism.267 That might include individuals who 
crossed state lines to commit terrorism—such as the white supremacist who 
plowed into protestors in Charlottesville268—or those who used email cross-
ing state lines to facilitate acts of violence. In addition, the authority over the 
“instrumentalities” of interstate commerce extends to the regulation of “per-
sons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come on-
ly from intrastate activities.”269 That category likely encompasses not only 
threats to mass transportation facilities—which are already criminalized un-
 
 264. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court sustained a federal prohibition on the local cultiva-
tion and use of medical marijuana on the grounds that, unlike the Violence Against Women 
Act, the federal Controlled Substances Act regulated activities that were “quintessentially eco-
nomic.” 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). Terrorism does not fit within the definition of “economics” cited 
in Gonzales—the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities”—although it 
certainly threatens the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities by poten-
tially damaging commercial facilities, suppressing consumption, and destabilizing financial 
markets. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)). It is not 
clear whether the noneconomic status of a class of activities rules out the application of the 
third category of Commerce Clause power, which covers the regulation of activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Morrison suggests that noneconomic activities might 
qualify in an unprecedented case. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. Some appellate decisions, such 
as United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006), find the economic nature of the 
regulated activity relevant to, but not required for, the application of the third category. 
 265. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (observing that the Violence 
Against Women Act was not restricted to violence “directed at the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, interstate markets, or things or persons in interstate commerce”). 
 266. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting that statute at issue had “no express jurisdictional el-
ement which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have 
an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce”). 
 267. See, e.g., Patton, 451 F.3d at 621 (describing regulation of channels of interstate 
commerce as including the power to regulate the passage of people or goods in interstate 
commerce). 
 268. See Joe Ruiz, Ohio Man Charged with Murder in Fatal Car Attack on Anti-White 
Nationalist March, NPR: TWO-WAY (Aug. 13, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/13/543176250/charlottesville-attack-james-alex-fields-jr 
[https://perma.cc/4Q7S-CSPC]. 
 269. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
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der federal law270—but also “softer” targets of terrorism, such as shopping 
malls, restaurants, or workplaces of employers engaged in interstate com-
merce.271 Even attenuated connections to interstate commerce might be suf-
ficient, such as a statutory prohibition on domestic terrorism using a gun 
where prosecutors must demonstrate in individual cases that the gun had at 
some point passed through interstate commerce.272 
Moreover, in a non-Commerce Clause case, the Court has already 
opined that terrorism does not fall within the exclusive police powers of 
states. In Bond v. United States, the Court interpreted a federal statute im-
plementing the Chemical Weapons Convention to exclude a defendant’s at-
tempt to injure her husband’s lover with two toxic chemicals.273 The Court 
held that “our constitutional structure leaves local criminal activity primarily 
to the States” and that Congress had not clearly indicated that the law ex-
tended to such activity.274 But the Court expressly distinguished terrorism 
from other crime, stating that “[t]he Federal Government undoubtedly has a 
substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws against assassination, terror-
ism, and acts with the potential to cause mass suffering.”275 Those crimes 
“have not traditionally been left predominantly to the States, and nothing we 
have said here will disrupt the Government’s authority to prosecute such of-
fenses.”276 Thus, Bond suggests that the Court views some federal power—
perhaps including the Commerce Clause277—as authorizing the federal pros-
ecution of terrorism and other crimes with the potential to cause mass harm. 
Wherever the precise boundaries, constitutional doctrine likely allows 
much greater federal regulation of domestic terrorism than current statutes 
 
 270. 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (2012) (“Terrorist attacks and other violence against railroad carri-
ers and against mass transportation systems on land, on water, or through the air”). 
 271. To be sure, there are limits to what the Court might consider “things in interstate 
commerce,” and terrorism targeting a place of worship or a school might not qualify. In Jones 
v. United States, the Court refused to find that arson of a private home constituted damage to a 
property “used in interstate or foreign commerce,” in part on constitutional avoidance 
grounds. 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 (2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)). Nonetheless, Jones 
did not overturn a previous ruling that the statute applied to a building used as rental property. 
Id. at 853 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985)). While Jones indicates that there 
are outer limits to the theory, there seems to be ample room for federal jurisdiction over do-
mestic terrorism targeting facilities with a reasonable relationship to interstate commerce. 
 272. See Dean A. Strang, Felons, Guns, and the Limits of Federal Power, 39 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 385, 413 & n.139 (2006) (stating that federal appeals courts have uniformly upheld fed-
eral convictions for felons in possession of a firearm upon a mere showing that the firearm had 
once crossed state lines); see also Patton, 451 F.3d at 636 (upholding federal prohibition on 
possession by a felon of body armor as mandated by precedent, while observing the incon-
sistency with Lopez). 
 273. 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
 274. Bond, 572 U.S. at 848. 
 275. Id. at 864. 
 276. Id. The Court cited, with apparent approval, several other prosecutions involving 
domestic terrorism or other plots to commit serious harm. Id. 
 277. Id. at 854–55 (noting that government had waived a Commerce Clause defense). 
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permit. If existing federalism doctrine does not justify the gap between the 
federal criminalization of international and domestic terrorism, it leaves the 
question whether the principles behind federalism justify the divide. 
2. Federalism Principles 
 Scholarship on federal criminal jurisdiction suggests at least three con-
siderations in the choice between state and federal jurisdiction: (1) demo-
cratic accountability; (2) institutional competence; and (3) the relative need 
for centralization.278 These considerations, however, do not weigh in favor of 
a federal approach for international terrorism and a state/local approach for 
domestic terrorism.279 
Democratic Accountability. Legal scholars frequently cite democratic ac-
countability concerns as a reason for greater state and local, rather than fed-
eral, control over criminal law and policing. Some argue that local 
communities can shape crime policy in ways that respond to local prefer-
ences.280 Others contend that citizens can better oversee law enforcement ac-
tivities at the local level because police chiefs report to local elected officials, 
communities can monitor police performance, and police departments care 
about community relations.281 If such ideas are driving support for a limited 
federal approach to domestic terrorism, however, they both simplify federal 
and local dynamics with respect to terrorism and fail to explain why domes-
tic and international terrorism should be treated differently. 
As an initial matter, the historical record suggests that state and local 
dominance in counterterrorism does not necessarily serve democratic ac-
 
 278. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define 
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
1135 (1995); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Ad-
vantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1995); Daniel Richman, The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2006); Matthew C. 
Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 301–09 
(2012). 
 279. To be clear, the current approach is not a strict dichotomy. As discussed in Part I, 
federal terrorism law does cover some, but not all, domestic terrorism, and other federal non-
terrorism-specific criminal charges can also be used to prosecute domestic terrorism. In addi-
tion, the intelligence-gathering structures of federal, state, and local authorities are intertwined. 
For a description of local and state involvement in terrorism-related intelligence gathering, see 
Waxman, supra note 278, at 301–09 (describing FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces that co-
ordinate local, state, and federal responses to terrorism and DHS-funded Fusion Centers that 
share intelligence). 
 280. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 278, at 995 (“If state rather than federal law governs, local 
conditions and the policy preferences of a smaller community will govern such important mat-
ters as the definition of the conduct that should be criminal and the penalties that should be 
imposed.”); Brickey, supra note 278, at 1172–73 (arguing that federal assumption of responsi-
bility over “local law and order . . . interferes with a state’s ability to exercise discretion in a way 
that is responsive to local concerns”); see also Waxman, supra note 278, at 325–26. 
 281. Richman, supra note 278, at 420. 
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countability—at least if accountability is defined to include the protection of 
minority communities. Indeed, the failure of state and local authorities to 
protect black communities from domestic terrorism well into the twentieth 
century led to concerted advocacy for federal intervention.282 While overt 
state complicity in racial terrorism may have declined, some concern re-
mains that state-level prosecutions for racial violence are not always ade-
quate.283 Thus, the intuition that state and local criminal jurisdiction protects 
democratic control over policing—however true in other criminal justice 
contexts—may be misplaced with respect to terrorism.284 
To the extent that state and local involvement in counterterrorism does 
serve democratic accountability, such benefits may also apply to internation-
al terrorism. Several legal scholars have assessed the role of state and local 
law enforcement in post-9/11 counterterrorism policing and oversight.285 
They observe that some local and state agencies resisted intrusive federal in-
telligence-gathering programs directed at Muslim communities286 and may 
have greater structural incentives to protect rights than federal authorities.287 
Yet these scholars also observe that local authorities are subject to weak for-
mal constraints on intelligence gathering and that existing local oversight 
mechanisms operate poorly under limited transparency.288 These evaluations 
of “national security federalism” do not distinguish baldly between domestic 
and international terrorism but center on terrorism threats with a significant 
U.S. component, regardless of whether there are international links.289 If a 
stronger local role can keep law and law enforcement more accountable, that 
benefit likely straddles the domestic–international divide. 
 
 282. BERG, supra note 171, at 153–54; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 173, at 131–43 (de-
scribing failure of Reconstruction-era federal criminal civil rights laws and failed push to enact 
federal anti-lynching laws until the second Reconstruction). 
 283. LAWRENCE, supra note 173, at 155–58 (advocating federal hate crimes laws). 
 284. There is also a long history of local police forces engaging in abusive intelligence 
gathering, including the infiltration of political groups, in a quest to find anarchists, com-
munists, and other perceived radicals linked to international movements. See, e.g., Waxman, 
supra note 278, at 298–99. 
 285. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federal-
ism, and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941 (2005); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of 
Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX L. REV. 1715 (2010); Richman, supra note 278; Wax-
man, supra note 278. 
 286. Herman, supra note 285, at 947–49; Richman, supra note 278, at 418–19; Waxman, 
supra note 278, at 316–17. 
 287. Rascoff, supra note 285, at 1738–39. 
 288. Id. at 1741–42; Waxman, supra note 278, at 336–37. 
 289. Waxman, supra note 278, at 290 (coining the term “national security federalism”); 
see, e.g., id. at 346. These accounts focus nearly exclusively on terrorism linked to Islam and 
therefore do not analyze whether the efficacy or accountability of intelligence arrangements 
would differ with respect to other terrorism threats. See, e.g., Rascoff, supra note 285, at 1725 
n.38; Waxman, supra note 278, at 321. But Rascoff states that his account could apply to 
“homegrown terrorism inspired by any ideology.” Rascoff, supra note 285, at 725 n.38. 
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Institutional Competence. A second claim is that federal authorities are 
better equipped than states to respond to international terrorism, while 
states can handle domestic terrorism on their own.290 But that is not always 
so: local authorities are fully able to prosecute certain cases labeled interna-
tional terrorism, while federal agencies have greater expertise to address 
some types of domestic terrorism. 
Among international cases, those involving substantial extraterritorial 
activities or extensive relationships with foreign groups benefit from federal 
prosecution. Federal prosecutions may be superior where key information 
comes from U.S. or foreign intelligence agencies, where foreign governments 
have a direct interest in a case, or where cases target networks with substan-
tial international ties. In addition, prosecutors and courts in certain federal 
districts have developed expertise in terrorism trials, including in the man-
agement of classified information.291 
But not all—or even most—international terrorism cases have such 
characteristics. Legal scholars have argued for some time that the fragmenta-
tion of the international threat—from a once-centralized al Qaeda organiza-
tion to dispersed individuals and groups—increases the importance of police 
identifying threats through their presence and relationships in local com-
munities.292 In cases with limited foreign or federal intelligence sources, fed-
eral prosecutors do not have a clear advantage over local prosecutors. 
Furthermore, in certain cases, federal prosecutors and courts may ap-
pear to have greater expertise only because law enforcement previously 
treated a case as international. For instance, once federal agents obtain a 
FISA warrant, a federal prosecution may appear to be preferable because 
federal prosecutors and judges are more familiar with FISA. But at the outset 
of the investigation, the nature of the threat may not have exceeded the ca-
pacity of local law enforcement or state courts. Only the choice to treat the 
case as an international terrorism matter triggered FISA surveillance, which 
then made a federal prosecution more desirable.293 
On the other side of the divide, local and state authorities are not neces-
sarily better, or even adequate, at addressing all forms of domestic terrorism. 
 
 290. See Hennessey, supra note 21; McCarthy, supra note 194. 
 291. See, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the 
Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1006–26 (2018). 
 292. See Rascoff, supra note 285, at 1727–36 (arguing that local police’s size, diversity, 
mandate, and community relations enable them to conceptualize and gather intelligence relat-
ed to “homegrown terrorism”); Waxman, supra note 278, at 321–22 (arguing that local intelli-
gence, rather than federal intelligence surveillance, will likely become more important as 
terrorism threats include more domestic elements). 
 293. Note that the FISA statute contemplates state prosecutions based on FISA evidence. 
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(d) (2012) (requiring that states and political subdivisions provide 
notification of intended use of FISA evidence). But the statute requires that federal district 
courts hear motions for the disclosure or suppression of FISA evidence, even where the state 
prosecutes a case. Id. § 1806(f); United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (denying 
motion to suppress FISA evidence in Missouri state murder case). 
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Local agencies may lack the capacity to pull together information from other 
sources or to analyze data, hindering investigations of more organized forms 
of domestic terrorism.294 In addition, federal agencies may have greater re-
sources than local law enforcement. All told, the relative competence of fed-
eral or local/state institutions must be assessed at a lower level of generality 
than the international–domestic distinction. 
The Relative Need for Centralization. A third federalism consideration 
involves the merits of a uniform, centralized approach versus a varying, de-
centralized one. International terrorism cases often benefit from a coordi-
nated national strategy, especially where cases relate to a foreign terrorist 
group, involve witnesses or defendants from other jurisdictions, or otherwise 
intersect with foreign policy or defense interests involving other government 
agencies. Federal investigations and prosecutions facilitate such coordina-
tion. Indeed, in international terrorism cases, the Justice Department re-
quires U.S. attorneys around the country to notify, consult with, and 
sometimes obtain approval from the NSD Counterterrorism Section because 
of “the obvious need to ensure a well-coordinated Federal response.”295 
The value of coordination also applies to some domestic terrorism, how-
ever, and does not characterize all international terrorism. Domestic terror-
ism that involves multistate connections, organized training or recruitment 
efforts, and national trends benefits from a centralized approach. In fact, the 
Justice Department requires U.S. attorneys to notify the Counterterrorism 
Section in federal domestic terrorism cases because, “[t]o a significant de-
gree, this threat arises in connection with movements and groups whose ex-
istence spans multiple jurisdictions or even the entire nation, making 
effective coordination of these matters critical.”296 
The perception that international terrorism requires a more centralized 
response may reflect the traditional conception of that threat as centralized. 
To the extent that the threat instead comes from “lone wolves” or small 
groups, it resembles decentralized forms of right-wing violence.297 As preva-
lent forms of international and domestic terrorism in the United States ex-
hibit parallel manifestations, the relative need for national treatment varies 
less across them. 
*     *     * 
Federalism supplies unconvincing reasons for distinguishing between 
domestic and international terrorism. The benefits of a federal approach to 
international terrorism, including greater resources and national coordina-
 
 294. See Rascoff, supra note 285, at 1735–36 (describing local police’s limited analytical 
capabilities). 
 295. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 118, § 9-2.136 (“Notification, Consultation, and Ap-
proval Requirements for International Terrorism Matters”). 
 296. Id. § 9-2.137 (“Notification Requirements in Domestic Terrorism Matters”). 
 297. For further discussion of this shift, see Section II.C.1. 
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tion, also apply to domestic terrorism. The potential burdens of an expanded 
federal approach to domestic terrorism, including reduced local oversight 
and the exposure of defendants to unfavorable procedural and sentencing 
rules,298 also characterize federal jurisdiction over international terrorism. 
Increased federalization of domestic terrorism is not necessarily the so-
lution. A system of dual jurisdiction tends to ratchet up punishment as a 
whole, allowing prosecutors to select the jurisdiction that is more likely to 
convict and impose a harsh sentence.299 Moreover, there are good reasons to 
hesitate before enacting new terrorism offenses at any level: legislators often 
create new laws hastily in response to high-profile incidents and with insuf-
ficient regard to civil liberties and democratic values.300 While these con-
cerns caution against adopting new federal domestic terrorism charges, they 
also challenge the fairness and accountability of the existing jurisdictional 
approach to international terrorism. 
C. Magnitude-of-the-Threat Rationales 
In addition to civil liberties and federalism, a third rationale invoked in 
support of the legal divide is that international terrorism presents a signifi-
cantly greater threat than domestic terrorism. Commentators contrast the 
seriousness of Islamic extremist violence with that of other terrorism threats 
and map that distinction onto the international–domestic divide. Some 
make an explicit claim of incomparable harm.301 In other cases, the belief 
operates as an unstated background intuition, perhaps driven by the sheer 
scale of the September 11, 2001 attacks.302 Indeed, in the wake of those at-
tacks, the magnitude of the harm figured centrally in the move—by govern-
 
 298. In other areas of the law where dual state and federal criminal jurisdiction exists, 
differences related to the length of sentences, pretrial detention, access to discovery, the sup-
pression of evidence, and the amount of prison time served generally disfavor federal defend-
ants. Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
643, 669–75 (1997). 
 299. Indeed, the Justice Manual encourages this selection by stating that the “ultimate 
measure of the potential for effective prosecution in another jurisdiction is the sentence, or 
other consequence, that is likely to be imposed if the person is convicted.” JUSTICE MANUAL, 
supra note 118, § 9-27.240. 
 300. Laura K. Donohue, The Perilous Dialogue, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 370–73 (2009). 
 301. See, e.g., Neiwert, supra note 12 (statement of Rep. Peter King, chair of the House 
Homeland Security Committee, in 2011) (“There is no equivalency of threat between al Qaeda 
and neo-Nazis, environmental extremists or other isolated madmen. Only al Qaeda and its Is-
lamist affiliates in this country are part of an international threat to our nation.”); Reilly, supra 
note 1 (statement of FBI Director James Comey) (“[T]here really isn’t a domestic terrorism 
threat that poses the risk of actors in every state engaging in random, nearly random acts of 
violence coordinated in the way that ISIL is attempting to inspire direct activities.”). 
 302. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (upholding post-
9/11 FISA surveillance and distinguishing FISA purpose from “ordinary crime control” on the 
grounds that “it is hard to imagine greater emergencies facing Americans than those experi-
enced” on 9/11). 
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ment officials as well as some legal scholars—to conceptualize terrorism as a 
form of war, not crime.303 
The claim that international terrorism is more dangerous than domestic 
terrorism is difficult to assess for a host of reasons. Terrorism risk studies 
typically define terrorism risk as the product of three factors: threat (the 
probability of an attack), vulnerability (the probability of an attack’s success 
if it occurs), and consequences (the losses from a successful attack).304 These 
studies consider “threat” the most difficult factor to estimate, as it requires 
sensitive information and subjective evaluations of the intent and capabili-
 
 303. For instance, Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith argued that, prior to the 1990s, 
terrorism was thought to present a “relatively limited threat” that could be addressed through 
criminal law, but that increasing recognition of its potential to cause mass casualties shifted 
analysis toward an armed-conflict model. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 1094–95. 
Chesney and Goldsmith advocated a convergence of the criminal and military models to meet 
the “central legal challenge of modern terrorism”—the prevention of harm by “uniformless 
terrorists who have the capacity to inflict mass casualties and enormous economic harms and 
who thus must be stopped before they act.” Id. at 1081. Other legal commentators also argued 
for a combination of the two models and viewed the severity of the threat as a factor pointing 
toward the “war” framing. E.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a “Terrorist”? Drawing the Line 
Between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1257, 1320 & 
n.313 (arguing that the scale, organization, and pattern of al Qaeda attacks distinguished them 
from ordinary crime, while concluding that most suspects should be treated as criminal de-
fendants); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 
457, 461 (2002) (citing the scale of hostilities as a factor pointing to conceptualizing large-scale 
terrorist acts as war). While Section II.C considers whether the scale of domestic and interna-
tional threats justifies a differential criminal law regime, a full exposition of the war/crime di-
chotomy is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, as this distinction may lead some to 
ask whether international terrorism even qualifies as crime, a few points are in order. First, 
many legal scholars have critiqued the “war” framing of terrorism as inapt, contrary to interna-
tional law, or threatening to democratic norms. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, 
ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 105–07 (2012) (arguing that the idea of “wartime” provides a 
justification for controversial war powers and human rights infringements); PHILIP B. 
HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY 19–33 (2003) (arguing that describing con-
flict with al Qaeda as “war” is misleading and dangerous in the longer term); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Introduction: Defining Armed Conflict in the Decade After 9/11, in WHAT IS WAR? 
AN INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 3–11 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2012) (critiquing 
U.S. military response to terrorism as contrary to narrower international law conception of 
“armed conflict”). Second, even if one accepts that some international terrorism rises to the 
level of armed conflict, or justifies military responses, it does not follow that all international 
terrorism has such characteristics for perpetuity. Even under U.S. law, where there is a rich 
debate over how far the post-9/11 Authorization to Use Military Force extends, no one has ar-
gued that the United States is at war with every international terrorist group. Moreover, even 
with respect to international terrorism threats that are partly countered by military responses, 
the United States applies a criminal law paradigm to a large portion of individuals associated 
with such threats, especially within the United States. Within that paradigm, a two-tiered ap-
proach to terrorism must be independently justified, not simply rationalized on the grounds 
that individuals supporting certain organizations are engaged in acts of war. 
 304. See, e.g., HENRY H. WILLIS ET AL., ESTIMATING TERRORISM RISK 5–11 (2005); Barry 
Charles Ezell et al., Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk, 30 RISK ANALYSIS 575, 577 
(2010); Robert Powell, Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources, 101 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 527, 528–29 (2007). Many such studies assume a single adversary and focus on 
the relative risk to various targets, rather than the relative risk from different groups. 
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ties of terrorist actors.305 Each of the sources used for such assessments—
historical data, intelligence agency judgments, and expert opinions306—have 
serious limitations, even the evaluations of intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.307 
In light of these difficulties, the relative risk of international and domes-
tic terrorism is highly uncertain.308 But to the extent that the legal divide 
rests on the assumption of a greater international threat, its defenders have 
more work to do. First, some evidence related to the scale of recent incidents, 
the potential for mass casualties, and the organized nature of the violence 
suggests that domestic and international threats may not be as different as 
assumed. An asymmetric legal regime ought to be supported by a greater 
burden of proof. Moreover, even if one threat exceeded the other in the ag-
gregate, this would have a limited bearing on how the law should investigate 
and penalize individuals in the United States associated with each threat. 
1. Assessing the Scale of Threats 
At least five recent comparative quantitative studies cast doubt on the 
assumption that Islamic extremist terrorism is significantly more common 
or more deadly than terrorism based on other ideologies in the United 
States. These studies—produced by criminologists, the Government Ac-
countability Office, think tanks, and journalists—vary considerably in their 
methodologies and results, and not all define their categories or methods 
with precision. Nonetheless, in the aggregate, this research suggests that: (1) 
fewer incidents of Islamic extremist violence than right-wing extremist vio-
lence have occurred in the United States in recent decades; and (2) if one ex-
cludes the 9/11 attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing, the fatalities from 
Islamic extremist violence are either somewhat higher or substantially lower 
 
 305. See WILLIS ET AL., supra note 304, at 14; Ezell et al., supra note 304, at 577. 
 306. WILLIS ET AL., supra note 304, at 14; Ezell et al., supra note 304, at 577. 
 307. While intelligence and security agencies have greater information than the public, 
their assessments are affected by the agencies’ institutional mandates, jurisdiction, and biases. 
For instance, it is unsurprising that outward-focused federal security agencies describe Islamic 
extremist violence as the most significant terrorist threat, see, e.g., Threats to the Homeland: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (state-
ment of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation), while state and local law 
enforcement agencies characterize anti-government violent extremists as a greater threat in 
their own jurisdictions, Charles Kurzman & David Schanzer, Law Enforcement Assessment of 
the Violent Extremism Threat 3–4 (June 25, 2015) (working paper) (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review) (reporting that, of 382 law enforcement agencies, 74 percent identified anti-
government extremism as one of top three terrorist threats facing their jurisdictions while 39 
percent listed al Qaeda–inspired violent extremism or related Islamist threats as one of top 
three threats). In addition, political and partisan dynamics influence the intelligence produc-
tion process. Early in the Obama Administration, for instance, political pressure led DHS to 
disband an intelligence unit focused on right-wing extremists and focus nearly exclusively on 
Muslim extremists. Smith, supra note 212. 
 308. For a discussion of the high level of uncertainty in terrorism risk assessments as a 
whole, see WILLIS ET AL., supra note 304, at 13–14. 
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than those from right-wing violence, depending on the study.309 Either way, 
the studies discredit the common belief that Islamic extremists have claimed 
substantially more U.S. lives than other extremists in the post-9/11 period. 
Of course, the implications from such numbers are subject to dispute. 
For one thing, the inclusion of the 9/11 attacks and Oklahoma City bombing 
would significantly change the results.310 In addition, the death toll from ter-
rorism represents the fatalities that occurred, not those that might have oc-
curred in the absence of government intervention. Differential government 
 
 309. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-300, COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ASSESS PROGRESS OF FEDERAL 
EFFORTS 28–34 (2017) (identifying, based on data from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database, 62 
fatal incidents and 106 deaths from “[f]ar [r]ight [v]iolent [e]xtremist-[m]otivated [a]ttacks” 
between September 12, 2001 and December 31, 2016; 23 fatal incidents and 119 deaths result-
ing from “[r]adical Islamist [v]iolent [e]xtremist-[m]otivated [a]ttacks”; and no deaths from 
extremist environmental, animal liberation, or far-left beliefs during that time period); 
WILLIAM S. PARKIN ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND 
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2016) (concluding, based on data from the United 
States Extremist Crime Database, that between 1990 and 2014, and excluding the 9/11 and Ok-
lahoma City attacks, offenders associated with al Qaeda and affiliated movements killed 62 in-
dividuals in 38 incidents within the United States at least in part for ideological motivations, 
while far-right extremists killed 245 individuals in 177 incidents); Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism 
in America After 9/11: Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?, NEW AM., 
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/ 
[https://perma.cc/UY28-AWHP] (concluding, based on New America Foundation’s online 
database on post-9/11 terrorism, that “[j]ihadist” terrorist attacks since 9/11 have imposed a 
death toll comparable to “other forms of political . . . violence Americans face today” and iden-
tifying 104 deaths inside the United States caused by “jihadist” perpetrators, 86 by “[f]ar [r]ight 
[w]ing” individuals, and 8 by “[b]lack [s]eparatist/[n]ationalist/[s]upremacist” perpetrators); 
Neiwert, supra note 12 (reporting, based on an original database constructed by the Investiga-
tive Fund at the Nation Institute and Reveal from the Center for Investigative Reporting, 63 
cases of “Islamist domestic terrorism,” defined as “incidents motivated by a theocratic political 
ideology espoused by such groups as the Islamic State,” from 2008–2016, compared to 115 in-
cidents by right-wing extremists in the same period, but observing a higher total of 90 deaths 
associated with Islamist incidents compared to 79 deaths from right-wing extremist terrorism); 
Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism Deaths and Injuries by Ideology: Excluding the Outlier Attacks, 
CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/terrorism-deaths-ideology-
excluding-outlier-attacks [https://perma.cc/7UR7-NCBL] (identifying, based on data from 
sources including the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, RAND Corporation, 
and ESRI, 102 deaths in Islamist terrorist attacks, 51 from nationalist and right-wing terrorism, 
23 from left-wing terrorism, and 15 from unknown/other sources from 1992–2017, excluding 
9/11 and the Oklahoma City attacks); William Parkin et al., Analysis: Deadly Threat from Far-
Right Extremists Is Overshadowed by Fear of Islamic Terrorism, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 24, 
2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/analysis-deadly-threat-far-right-
extremists-overshadowed-fear-islamic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/YY79-JC3E] (updating sta-
tistics based on preliminary results from 2015–2017 to total 43 incidents and 136 deaths from 
Islamist extremism and 185 incidents and 272 deaths from far-right extremism). 
 310. PARKIN ET AL., supra note 309, at 2 (noting how results would change); Nowrasteh, 
supra note 309 (noting a change in the ratio of murders by ideology). 
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attention could skew the observed lethality of terrorism in either direction.311 
Other quantitative metrics suffer from similar problems.312 
Besides incident and casualty data, risk assessment takes into account 
factors such as the potential use of weapons of mass destruction and the or-
ganized nature of terrorist groups. A particular fear is that international 
groups may seek to inflict mass casualties through chemical, biological, radi-
ological, or nuclear weapons. Intelligence experts believe that al Qaeda and 
ISIS aspire to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some say ISIS has 
used chemical weapons over seventy times.313 Furthermore, greater concern 
over international terrorism stems from the organization and sophistication 
of international terrorist groups. While most far-right terrorism is linked to 
lone offenders and small groups,314 the role of large, well-resourced organi-
zations in international terrorism suggests the potential for more sophisti-
cated and more frequent incidents. 
Although these concerns may differentiate current international and 
domestic threats, the differences may be less sharp than commonly assumed. 
For instance, with respect to weapons of mass destruction, one study ob-
served that, while not one “homegrown jihadist extremist in the United 
States” had acquired or used chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
weapons, sixteen individuals motivated by “domestic” ideologies had used, 
acquired, or tried to acquire such weapons from 2001 to 2013.315 These in-
clude a former National Socialist Movement member seeking to poison Afri-
 
 311. Extensive U.S. efforts to counter international terrorism likely prevented some ter-
rorist attacks by degrading al Qaeda’s capabilities and intercepting plots. BIPARTISAN POLICY 
CTR., DEFEATING TERRORISTS, NOT TERRORISM: ASSESSING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
FROM 9/11 TO ISIS 33 (2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/BPC-
National-Security-Defeating-Terrorist-Not-Terrorism.pdf [https://perma.cc/28CM-H6KD]. 
But certain U.S. actions, like the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, 
and drone strikes in Pakistan, likely increased support for terrorism. See, e.g., MARC SAGEMAN, 
LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 138–39 (2008) (stat-
ing that U.S. invasion of Iraq and human rights abuses recruited additional terrorists). Thus, it 
is difficult to say which way greater government intervention skews the observed lethality of 
threats. 
 312. For instance, criminal conviction data largely reflect law enforcement priorities ra-
ther than the “natural” size of threats. The investigative focus on Muslim communities gener-
ates relatively more convictions of Muslims for inchoate crimes, material support, and routine 
crimes detected in the course of investigations. See Akbar, supra note 5, at 861–65 (describing 
preventative counterterrorism focus on Muslim communities). 
 313. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 311. 
 314. See, e.g., Brent R. Klein et al., Opportunity, Group Structure, Temporal Patterns, and 
Successful Outcomes of Far-Right Terrorism Incidents in the United States, 63 CRIME & DELINQ. 
1224, 1238 (2017) (citing studies showing increasing utilization of “lone wolf” strategies by far-
right extremists); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 9, 
at 5 (assessing white supremacist violence as likely to come from “lone offenders or small cells, 
rather than the resources of larger groups, due to the decentralized and often disorganized sta-
tus of the [White Supremacist Extremist] movement”). 
 315. PETER BERGEN ET AL., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., JIHADIST TERRORISM: A THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 15–16 (2013). 
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can Americans with sarin nerve gas, anti-government extremists intending 
to deliver hydrogen cyanide gas through a building’s ventilation system, and 
an anarchist who hid toxic chemicals in a Chicago transit tunnel.316 While 
this historical data does not imply equivalent risk from international and 
domestic threats,317 it does suggest that the intent and capability to use high-
ly lethal weapons is not limited to international terrorists.318 
In addition, both domestic and international terrorist threats have be-
come less centralized in response to government interventions and the rise 
of the internet. Within two years of the September 11 attacks, researchers 
were noting al Qaeda’s growing decentralization.319 In 2008, terrorism ana-
lyst Marc Sageman argued that a new “leaderless jihad”—centered on auton-
omous groups training online and financing their own operations—had 
largely replaced “al Qaeda Central” as a threat.320 Others countered that core 
al Qaeda continued to represent a significant threat.321 But in the ensuing 
years, the publication of an al Qaeda magazine seeking to motivate individu-
al terrorism and several terrorist incidents by U.S. individuals further indi-
cated a shift to unaffiliated terrorism.322 
 
 316. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INTELLIGENCE 
ASSESSMENT: DOMESTIC TERRORISTS’ INTENT AND CAPABILITY TO USE CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6–8 (2008), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBIdomesticcbrn.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GYM-G823]. 
 317. See Ezell et al., supra note 304, at 577 (noting importance of knowledge of “motiva-
tions, intent, and capabilities of terrorists . . . in addition to or instead of knowledge about his-
torical attacks and their relevance to current risk”). 
 318. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 316, at 8. 
The 2008 FBI assessment concluded that, among domestic terrorists, “it is likely that a handful 
of lone offenders will continue to pursue chemical and biological materials,” but that most 
domestic terrorists lacked the “intent or capability” to use such weapons, and that most such 
plots would be relatively small-scale because of technical and logistical limitations. Id. The as-
sessment also noted that, while the use of radiological material by domestic terrorists was 
“highly unlikely,” a “rudimentary radiological dispersion device” was within their “technical 
capability,” id., and that a successful attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
weapons would spread fear and likely inspire copycat attacks, id. at 9. 
 319. Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.–Aug. 2003, at 27, 28, 33 (de-
scribing al Qaeda’s constant evolution and its interest in the nonhierarchical, “leaderless re-
sistance” model popularized by U.S. neo-Nazi leader Louis Beam); see also Chesney, supra note 
133, at 437–41 (describing the rise of unaffiliated terrorism as a result of technological devel-
opments and the spread of a “global jihad movement”). 
 320. SAGEMAN, supra note 311, at 139–40. 
 321. See Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama Bin Laden Still 
Matters, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2008, at 133, 134; see also Matthew C. Waxman, The Struc-
ture of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 429, 431 (2010) 
(describing debate among terrorism analysts as to the top-down or bottom-up nature of the 
terrorist threat). 
 322. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST 
TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 1, 9, 17 (2013); see also Rascoff, supra note 285, 
at 1728 (citing evidence that “the contemporary jihad is increasingly organized around small 
groups of men who become radicalized at certain virtual and bricks-and-mortar nodes”). 
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The rise of ISIS has reinforced attention to lone actors and very small 
groups of people with no formal organizational ties, such as those who 
claimed to act on behalf of ISIS in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Manhat-
tan.323 In late 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified that the availa-
bility of online propaganda and training enabled individual violence and 
represented a “significant transformation from the terrorist threat our nation 
faced a decade ago.”324 Such assessments do not discount the seriousness of 
the threat or deny the possibility of direct plots by international groups.325 
But they suggest that the international threat has changed considerably since 
9/11 shaped U.S. perceptions of international terrorism. 
2. The Relevance of Scale 
Even if the threat of international terrorism, in the aggregate, represents 
a greater threat than domestic terrorism, that difference does not support the 
differentiated legal treatment of individuals within the United States. There 
are at least three objections to the idea that greater expected harm from in-
ternational terrorism would justify the legal divide in criminal law. 
The first objection relates to the overinclusiveness of the international 
terrorism category. The distinctive legal treatment of international terrorism 
applies to an exceedingly diverse set of threats, only some of which present a 
real threat to the United States.326 As discussed, the ban on material support 
to foreign terrorist groups applies to organizations engaged in national con-
flicts that only marginally affect the United States.327 Such groups present far 
less of a threat than domestic militias or anti-government groups targeting 
Americans.328 Similarly, FISA surveillance targets “agents of foreign powers” 
within the United States but treats groups of as few as two individuals as for-
eign powers.329 Nothing in FISA law limits its application to established or-
 
 323. See, e.g., Katie Worth, Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More 
Deadly, PBS: FRONTLINE (July 14, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-
wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-and-more-deadly/ [https://perma.cc/ZK4P-XASS]. 
 324. World Wide Threats: Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Christopher A. Wray, 
Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 
 325. Id. Other sources indicate that, in some cases, ISIS provides logistical and even fi-
nancial support to those who act in its name. E.g., Clare Ellis, With a Little Help from My 
Friends: An Exploration of the Tactical Use of Single-Actor Terrorism by the Islamic State,  
PERSP. ON TERRORISM, Dec. 2016, at 41, 41; Rukmini Callimachi, Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: 
How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots from Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XNT-MW5Y]. 
 326. HEYMANN, supra note 303, at 22–26 (disaggregating size and nature of terrorism 
threats and warning against tendency to view them as part of a single conflict with a single en-
emy). 
 327. See supra Section II.A. 
 328. See supra Section II.A. 
 329. See supra Section I.A.1. 
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ganizations, substantial threats, or groups remotely analogous to foreign 
states.330 
The image of Islamic extremist violence as a single global conspiracy 
likely affects the categorical treatment of international terrorism. That fram-
ing may account for the tendency to view U.S. individuals supporting mili-
tant groups abroad, like Somalia’s al-Shabaab, as a direct threat to the United 
States.331 The framing may also serve law enforcement officials’ strategic ob-
jectives, such as convicting defendants for crimes by individuals far removed 
from them on expansive theories of a “global jihadist” conspiracy.332 But nei-
ther international terrorism nor Islamic militancy are unitary categories.333 
Second, even if some international threats pose grave risks, domestic in-
telligence and law enforcement activities are not the sole response. For in-
stance, diplomatic efforts to secure nuclear material are key to preventing 
foreign terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruc-
tion.334 In addition, even those who reject the United States’ expansive war 
on terror acknowledge that, under international law, significant attacks or 
the imminent threat of a terrorist attack can justify military strikes under the 
law of armed conflict.335 The legitimate scope of military responses to terror-
ism is subject to intense debate. But to the extent that fears of “existential” 
threats sustain the distinctive criminal law approach to international terror-
ism, domestic criminal law operates alongside other mechanisms to counter 
such concerns. 
Third, the current approach to international terrorism within the United 
States makes little effort to distinguish between individuals with and without 
a plausible connection to grave international threats. If the domestic–
international legal divide turns on the fear of sophisticated plots inflicting 
large-scale violence, many international terrorism defendants appear ex ante 
 
 330. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 331. See ARUN KUNDNANI, THE MUSLIMS ARE COMING! ISLAMOPHOBIA, EXTREMISM, 
AND THE DOMESTIC WAR ON TERROR 211–12 (2014) (describing investigation of Somali com-
munity premised on fear that U.S. recruits to al-Shabaab would threaten United States, despite 
evidence of al-Shabaab’s exclusive focus on East Africa). 
 332. See, e.g., Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 1105 (describing conviction of 
Jose Padilla on the government’s “sweeping account of the global jihad movement as a single 
conspiracy”). 
 333. For one account of internal divisions within the “jihadist movement,” including the 
rise of groups like al Qaeda focused on transnational jihad, see generally FAWAZ A. GERGES, 
THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL (2d ed. 2009). 
 334. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM, CHAPTER 4: THE GLOBAL 
CHALLENGE OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR (CBRN) TERRORISM 
(2016), https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272236.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3QM-89EN] 
(describing the importance of international diplomatic initiatives in preventing terrorist 
groups from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons). 
 335. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 
889 (2002) (arguing that international law allows states to use self-defense in response to sig-
nificant armed attacks or imminent attacks where target states bear responsibility and where 
the attacks comply with international humanitarian law). 
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to lack the capabilities or relationships to carry out such plots. A litany of in-
ternational terrorism cases involve defendants who were mentally unstable 
or incompetent,336 who learned of particular foreign organizations only from 
FBI informants,337 or whose only connection to an organization was ideolog-
ical.338 For example, in one informant-generated plot to attack New York 
targets at the ostensible behest of foreign terrorists, the trial judge called the 
lead defendant, James Cromitie, “incapable of committing an act of terror-
ism on his own.”339 While sentencing him to the statutory minimum of 25 
years, she opined, “Only the government could have made a terrorist out of” 
Cromitie, “whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in scope.”340 
In such cases, little connects the individuals in question to the most sig-
nificant concerns surrounding foreign terrorist organizations. The concern 
over al Qaeda acquiring a nuclear weapon, for instance, bears little relation-
ship to minimally functional individuals targeted for prosecution. While 
such individuals may still inflict substantial harm on their own, that threat 
resembles that of a domestic terrorist or conventional mass shooter. Threat 
comparisons in the aggregate mask the substantial similarities across indi-
vidual U.S. defendants.341 
III. THE PATH FORWARD 
Part II of this Article challenged the leading rationales for the legal di-
vide between domestic and international terrorism. This Part reflects on 
what sustains that legal divide, despite its limited coherence, and sketches a 
path forward. While some advocate escalating the criminal law’s response to 
domestic terrorism to level the legal regimes, this Part contends that de-
escalating the law’s approach to international terrorism would better protect 
liberty, equality, and other core democratic values. 
 
 336. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 27–41 (describing eight cases of individu-
als who “showed serious signs early on that they struggled with mental or intellectual disabili-
ties—diagnosed mental health problems or significantly low intelligence or difficulty 
comprehending basic concepts”). 
 337. AARONSON, supra note 5, at 143 (describing informant’s pretense to act on behalf of 
Jaish-e-Mohammed, a terrorist organization that the defendant had never heard of). 
 338. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Suarez, No. 4:15-cr-10009-JEM-1 (S.D. Fla. July 
28, 2015) (filing charges against Florida man who obtained an explosive device from an under-
cover informant after posting on social media in favor of ISIS, but who had no actual contact 
with organization); Office of Pub. Affairs,  supra note 8 (reporting conviction of Suarez on 
2339B material support charge); Complaint, United States v. Loewen, No. 13-cr-10200-MLB 
(D. Kan. Dec. 13, 2013) (filing charges against Kansas man inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki for 
attempted material support to al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula based on informant plot). 
 339. AARONSON, supra note 5, at 150. 
 340. Id. at 150–51. 
 341. Indeed, some defendants themselves draw the analogy. See Christopher Dickey, In-
side the Head of Dylann Roof, Jihadist for White Hate, DAILY BEAST (May 22, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-head-of-dylann-roof-a-terrorist-paradigm 
[https://perma.cc/MK5R-GRU2] (noting Charleston shooter Roof’s self-comparison to ji-
hadists and the common elements across terrorist cases). 
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A. The Invidious Nature of the Legal Divide 
If the rationales for separating the legal treatment of domestic and inter-
national terrorism are unpersuasive, it raises the question why they have 
traction. History and social psychology suggest that the legal divide persists, 
at least in part, because it tracks deep-seated tendencies to distinguish be-
tween insiders and outsiders on racial and xenophobic terms. Because for-
eign or nonwhite people—and their ideas—have long been perceived as 
threatening, the harsher treatment of international terrorism accords with 
implicit beliefs. Historical patterns of “othering” also make it natural for the 
international category to expand to cover ethnic and racial minorities who 
are experienced as a threat, whether or not they have true international ties. 
Social psychology studies suggest that heightened threat perceptions 
consolidate in-group attachments and sharpen distinctions with out-
groups.342 Government policies that respond to these perceptions with 
measures to protect in-groups from outsiders, such as restrictive immigra-
tion policies, in turn reinforce the belief that outsiders present a threat.343 
Historians and legal scholars have amply documented the out-casting of 
segments of the population in response to past security fears. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, government officials and the public 
regularly conflated aliens with radicals, viewing the foreign-born as security 
threats to be countered with exclusion, deportation, and restrictive naturali-
zation laws.344 David Cole has argued that the United States regularly ex-
tended policies first used against immigrants to citizens perceived to be 
associated with a foreign threat, as in the internment of Japanese Americans 
and McCarthy-era investigations of subversives.345 
The tendency to close ranks in opposition to perceived enemies mani-
fested prominently after the 9/11 attacks. In a classic piece juxtaposing “The 
Citizen and the Terrorist,” Leti Volpp argued that the attacks consolidated 
American national identity against a new, racialized category of people who 
appeared to be Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.346 Government profiling 
and private hate crimes branded even U.S. citizens among these groups as 
outsiders, because popular conceptions of citizenship turn on identity and 
solidarity as much as legal status.347 According to Volpp, racial and other dif-
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ferences place some citizens at risk of “perpetual extraterritorialization”—of 
relegation to the status of foreigners “when their behavior affronts.”348 
While dramatic events like 9/11 sharply inflect processes of racialization, 
preexisting cultural associations provide ready frames by which to interpret 
such events. Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson argue that several decades’ 
worth of popular stereotypes, media representations, legal policies, and ef-
forts to build support for U.S. Middle East policy led to the pre-9/11 social 
construction of Arabs and Muslims as “[t]errorists and [r]eligious 
[f]anatics.”349 They contend that this “complex matrix of ‘otherness’ based 
on race, national origin, religion, culture, and political ideology may [have] 
contribute[d] to the ferocity of the U.S. government’s” post-9/11 “attacks on 
the civil rights of Arabs and Muslims.”350 
Federal and state policies in the years since September 11 reinforced ide-
as of Islam as foreign, threatening, and oppositional to American identity. 
Amna Akbar has argued that law enforcement “radicalization” theories iden-
tified the “religious and political cultures of Muslim communities” as the 
source of the terrorist threat and served to justify preventative policing 
measures targeting the communities as a whole.351 Because these state poli-
cies “situate[d] Muslim and American identity as antipodes,” they obligated 
members of these communities to choose between identities.352 Others ob-
serve that, for Somali Muslims in the United States, government surveillance 
programs marked them as “black twice”—subject to two levels of historically 
disfavored status and therefore particularly “outside the bounds of national 
belonging.”353 
The terrorism legal dichotomy thus exists today against a background of 
implicit associations linking Muslims, foreigners, nonwhites, and terrorists 
in the popular imagination. The “international terrorism” side of the divide 
conjures images of violent, dark-skinned Muslims who threaten us here and 
abroad. The “domestic terrorism” category conveys an entirely different so-
cial meaning: if one can envision a white Christian American as a terrorist at 
all, he remains nonetheless “one of us.” 
These dynamics help explain both the greater harshness of the interna-
tional terrorism category and the slippage in classifications. Even where legal 
definitions of domestic and international terrorism center on the location of 
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conduct, rather than the identity or ideology of suspects, legal actors bring to 
the interpretive enterprise a set of preexisting notions about who falls within 
each category. These notions make it natural both to characterize Muslim 
suspects as international threats and to discount the transnational connec-
tions of white supremacists or like-minded members of dominant racial 
groups. 
In fact, the differentiation between domestic and international threats 
may exhibit parallel dynamics even beyond the terrorism context. Some have 
made analogous arguments with respect to MS-13, the criminal gang con-
sisting of mostly Salvadoran immigrant youth. The legal and rhetorical des-
ignation of the organization as a “transnational gang” has facilitated 
sweeping criminal and immigration measures against suspected gang mem-
bers and their communities.354 That crackdown “shields gangs without 
transnational ties, such as White gangs in nonimmigrant White neighbor-
hoods . . . .”355 At the same time, the focus on the gang’s international char-
acter obscures both its U.S. origins and the potential for domestic, non-
immigration-based policies to counter its influence.356 Domestic–
international legal dichotomies seem prone to conceptualization and appli-
cation along racialized lines. 
B. Formal and Substantive Equality 
The law of domestic and international terrorism violates the “generality 
principle.” In a 1949 decision, Justice Jackson famously argued that laws of 
general applicability protect against the political temptation to target minori-
ties for unfavorable treatment.357 He wrote that “nothing opens the door to 
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose 
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political 
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affect-
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ed.”358 Legal scholars have applied this insight to other formal legal divisions 
in counterterrorism law. For instance, David Cole and Neal Katyal have ar-
gued that requiring equal treatment of citizens and noncitizens helps society 
calibrate an appropriate liberty–security balance by internalizing the costs of 
counterterrorism policies.359 
Like citizenship distinctions, the legal divide between domestic and in-
ternational terrorism allows officials to impose harsh rules with respect to 
racial others that they would not mete out on dominant communities. A re-
quirement of formal equality in law design and implementation broadens 
the class of people who will be affected, facilitating greater consideration of 
the benefits as well as the costs of antiterrorism policies. 
Of course, formal equality does not establish substantive equality. Be-
cause in-group/out-group dynamics run deep, the unequal treatment of 
Muslims, immigrants, or other minority groups will not end if the law drops 
the domestic–international legal divide. Moreover, the intense focus on U.S. 
Muslim communities in counterterrorism exists even where the law does not 
formally distinguish between domestic and international terrorism—as in 
the legal standards for terrorist watchlisting or FBI enterprise investiga-
tions.360 
Neutralizing the legal binary would nonetheless provide a significant 
step forward. It would remove an important set of laws that authorize differ-
ential treatment, especially in the use of material support charges. Moreover, 
it would undercut a core rationalization for disparities. As Ian Haney López 
has argued, law constructs race through “coercion and ideology”—both by 
imposing rules and by transmitting ideas.361 The domestic–international le-
gal divide today communicates the legitimacy of different treatment across 
threats, ideologies, and identities, and serves to insulate law enforcement ac-
tions from charges of invidious discrimination. Stripping away plausibly 
neutral explanations for the terrorism divide can force a confrontation with 
bare inequality. 
C. The Problem with Ratcheting Up 
If the uneven legal treatment of domestic and international terrorism is 
the problem, then the solution could be to make the overall regime either 
more or less harsh across the board. Many public critics of the divide have 
advocated intensifying the law’s treatment of domestic terrorism through en-
acting new terrorism offenses, especially at the federal level.362 They argue 
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that criminal law would thereby express a “moral equivalen[ce]” between 
domestic and international terrorism.363 Law enforcement officers and pros-
ecutors increasingly point to progressive critiques of inequality as a reason to 
enhance their legal powers.364 Yet calls to “ratchet up” terrorism law ignore 
the potential liberty and equality costs of doing so. 
Recent scholarship has argued that, despite the association of law-and-
order policies with conservatives, liberals and progressives contributed to the 
severity of the criminal justice system over time.365 For instance, some have 
argued that feminists combatting rape, domestic violence, and human traf-
ficking shored up the “carceral state.”366 Liberal activists likewise capitalized 
on the war on crime to enact new hate crimes laws.367 Critics have argued 
that the alliance with law-and-order politics exacted a heavy price: it rein-
forced mass incarceration, including that of women and minorities,368 lim-
ited due process and privacy protections for defendants,369 displaced radical 
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interpretations of the underlying problems,370 and diverted attention from 
alternative social, economic, or nonlegal reforms.371 
Together with legal scholarship on terrorism and security, these cri-
tiques suggest at least three reasons not to ratchet up the legal regime for 
domestic terrorism. First, the serious civil liberties and accountability objec-
tions to the treatment of international terrorism caution against extending it. 
Scholars have forcefully critiqued material support laws, informant-driven 
investigations, FISA surveillance, NSLs, and other features of the policing 
and prosecution of international terrorism. Many observe that material sup-
port prosecutions risk punishing thought crimes without action and chilling 
political speech.372 Critics argue that the FBI’s use of informants operational-
izes reductive theories of radicalization, targets mentally and economically 
vulnerable individuals, instigates crimes that would not have occurred with-
out government inducement, and eludes meaningful regulation.373 Further 
concern surrounds the limited adversarial contestation and oversight availa-
ble over the powerful surveillance tools authorized for international terror-
ism, including FISA warrants and NSLs.374 And others contend that the 
“extraordinarily punitive” sentences in terrorism cases are rooted in false no-
tions of defendants’ irredeemable nature and impose harms on Muslim 
communities similar to those affecting African American communities in 
the War on Drugs.375 These concerns over free speech and privacy, govern-
ment accountability, anticipatory prosecution, and harsh punishment weigh 
against subjecting more people to the international terrorism paradigm. 
Second, an escalated approach to domestic terrorism would likely have 
unintended distributional consequences. Even if new laws seek to counter 
white nationalist violence, the police and prosecutors who use them may end 
up targeting racial minorities. Systemic racial disparities in criminal justice 
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and the state’s historical response to political threats provide reason for con-
cern. In the 1960s, the FBI infiltrated and disrupted the civil rights move-
ment and black dissidents more broadly than the Klan and other white 
supremacist groups.376 Recent developments, including publication of a 2017 
intelligence report on “Black Identity Extremists”377 and prosecutions of 
black and indigenous rights activists, have aggravated concern over the 
chilling of political protest.378 Although federal authorities also surveil and 
target white nationalists, one study concluded that the FBI uses more ques-
tionable tactics against left-wing threats.379 
In a different context, the domestic extension of legal authorities initially 
directed at an international threat has already produced disparate racial ef-
fects. Sociologist Elizabeth Bernstein has argued that U.S. feminists seeking 
greater criminalization of prostitution and pornography faced opposition 
from other women’s activists and liberals but secured a stronger state re-
sponse by redirecting attention to the international “traffic in women.”380 
Once the international campaign prevailed, federal legislation established a 
domestic trafficking offense “on a moral and legal par with previous cross-
border understandings of the crime.”381 But the new sex trafficking offense 
hiked sentences for pimping from several months to up to ninety-nine years, 
and most of those prosecuted were African American.382 The initial framing 
of a threat as international may generate simplistic representations of the 
problem and dampen political opposition, while the subsequent extension to 
the domestic realm results in punitive and racially disproportionate conse-
quences. 
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The third, and most sweeping, objection to ratcheting up is that it 
frames terrorism as primarily a problem of criminal law. Despite the tenden-
cy in American law and politics to understand problems in penal terms, 
some have advanced alternative frames. For instance, Arun Kundnani has 
argued that law enforcement “radicalization” theories for Islamic extremist 
violence misdiagnose the problem as religious pathology rather than political 
opposition to state practices.383 Others have advocated strengthening social 
services and community-based programs, rather than coercive law enforce-
ment practices, to prevent alienation within marginalized communities.384 In 
a similar vein, those concerned with white nationalist violence might attend 
to its structural and political drivers rather than the crimes of individual of-
fenders alone. For instance, if economic dislocation contributes to domestic 
terrorism, then socioeconomic reforms offer an alternative set of policy re-
sponses. If high-level white nationalist rhetoric licenses racist terrorism, then 
the problem and solution are fundamentally political. Criminal justice re-
sponses tend to win wider acceptance, but at the risk of displacing more sys-
temic explanations and reforms. 
None of this is to suggest that political or law enforcement authorities 
should not devote greater attention to domestic terrorism. Growing evidence 
suggests that government agencies failed to monitor—and devote investiga-
tive resources to—white nationalist violence and other forms of domestic 
terrorism over the past decade, in part due to political constraints and pro-
fessional disincentives.385 Increased data-gathering, investigation, and prose-
cution of terrorism, however, differs from the adoption of new criminal 
charges, the designation of domestic terrorist groups, or the expansion of lit-
tle-regulated informant practices. Addressing domestic terrorism need not 
involve ratcheting up the applicable coercive legal regime. 
D. The Path to Ratcheting Down 
This Article aims primarily to destabilize the belief that separate legal re-
gimes for domestic and international terrorism are rational and fair—not to 
prescribe an ideal legal regime. While a full account of costs and benefits 
would exceed the limits of a single article, this Section offers initial reflec-
tions. 
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Several approaches are available to ratchet down the legal treatment of 
international terrorism. The first approach would remove or reduce the for-
mal distinction between domestic and international terrorism in existing 
laws, guidelines, and practices. While eliminating the statutory prohibition 
on material support for foreign terrorist organizations would constitute a 
drastic change, more modest reforms could include requiring that prosecu-
tors prove a defendant’s specific intent to support an organization’s unlawful 
activities, or prohibiting the prosecution of speech coordinated with foreign 
terrorist organizations. The last of these possibilities would overturn the re-
sult in HLP by giving speech in coordination with foreign organizations 
equal First Amendment protection as speech coordinated with domestic 
groups. 
Other changes would equalize oversight and accountability of law en-
forcement practices. For instance, the Justice Department could require the 
same oversight of international terrorism informants as it mandates for do-
mestic terrorism and rein in the heavy-handed use of informants. In addi-
tion, Congress or the Justice Department could mandate consistent policies 
for tracking and characterizing terrorism cases. For example, rather than re-
lease lists of international terrorism convictions, the department could re-
lease statistics on terrorism as a whole, covering both federal and state 
prosecutions and cases with or without explicit terrorism charges. 
The second approach would shrink the application of the international 
terrorism category to scenarios with a substantial relationship to interna-
tional terrorism. As I have argued, the international terrorism category ex-
pands to reach individuals with marginal international connections—a 
predictable result of law enforcement interests in maximizing their authority 
and the attribution of foreignness to racial, ethnic, and religious minority 
communities. While this slippage provides a reason to eliminate the distinc-
tion altogether, at a minimum, reformers should insist that those who are 
tarred with the international brush really qualify. 
For instance, in the FISA context, advocates could require the govern-
ment to make public the FISA Court’s interpretations of the degree of inter-
national nexus required to satisfy FISA definitions of “international 
terrorism” and “agent of a foreign power.”386 Indeed, the USA Freedom Act 
requires the Director of National Intelligence to make public FISA Court or-
ders that provide “a significant construction or interpretation of any provi-
sion of law” and mandates amicus participation in any court hearing on “a 
novel or significant interpretation of the law.”387 Advocates could use these 
provisions to press the question.388 
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Similarly, where the government charges defendants with crimes requir-
ing an international nexus—material support to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion or conduct transcending national boundaries—courts should insist on 
meaningful international connections. The strength of such international 
connections affects not just individual guilt but also the legitimacy of the le-
gal regime. While the legal categories persist, courts should insist on correct-
ly categorizing individual conduct. 
The third approach to ratcheting down the treatment of international 
terrorism is essential but the most difficult. Moving beyond formal equality 
in legal categories, it requires addressing the bigger legal, cultural, and politi-
cal factors that produce the harsh regime now in place for terrorism by Mus-
lims. Those factors include the pervasiveness of racial othering, the 
willingness to grant exceptional powers to the state in perceived emergen-
cies, the punitive turn in American law and culture, and the casting of Islam 
as a global civilizational enemy. It requires revisiting the full matrix of laws 
and practices that apply differently across racial and ideological lines, no 
matter their formal neutrality. Ratcheting down terrorism law ends up as 
one piece of a larger struggle to ratchet down the carceral and security state. 
CONCLUSION 
Equalizing the legal treatment of domestic and international terrorism 
will not eliminate racial, religious, or ideological disparities in the treatment 
of political violence. Intense surveillance and the aggressive use of inform-
ants in Muslim communities will likely not end, while some government of-
ficials and members of the public will still treat terrorism by white suspects 
as aberrational and apolitical. But dislodging the domestic–international di-
vide will undercut disparate treatment in some areas of the law and under-
mine the legitimizing ideas behind disparities in others. 
Recent high-profile acts of white nationalist violence have led some to 
demand a broader and harsher terrorism legal regime. While greater atten-
tion to such forms of terrorism is warranted, ratcheting up the legal regime 
through new domestic terrorism laws is the wrong solution. Reformers 
should restore fairness and oversight to terrorism law across the board, not 
subject more people to extraordinary and often unaccountable law enforce-
ment power. 
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